Earlier this week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Mexican Secretary of Public Safety Genaro Garcia Luna signed a Declaration of Principles of Cooperation on Joint Efforts to Secure the U.S.-Mexico Border. The declaration expands on Merida Initiative programs to improve cooperation in intelligence-driven operations, increase bilateral situation awareness of threats, and bolster the personnel, infrastructure, and technology needed to prevent criminal exploitation of entry points.
While border security may seem to dominate the relationship between the United States and Mexico, it is only one of many bilateral issues that the two nations grapple with. The authors of the two essays below have different opinions on the track record of U.S-Mexican cooperation. Dr. Craig Deare argues that ways must be found to enhance collaboration and cooperation in defense relationships, while General Victor Renuart and Dr. Biff Baker contend that the creation of U.S. Northern Command has greatly improved cooperation in all complementary areas of concern.
U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface
by Craig A. Deare
U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface
by Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Monday, February 22, 2010
An Operation by Any Other Name. . .
In the next issue of JFQ, Colonel William Mullen III, USMC, discusses his involvement in helping to turn around the city of Fallujah, Iraq, during Operation Al Fajr - in English, Operation New Dawn. Perhaps tapping into the positive experience associated with the name, the Obama administration has announced that starting in September, Operation Iraqi Freedom will be known as Operation New Dawn.
NOTE: The following article discusses the name change and was written by Greg Jaffe. It appeared in the Washington Post on February 19, 2010.
War in Iraq will be called 'Operation New Dawn' to reflect reduced U.S. role
By Greg Jaffe
The Obama administration has decided to give the war in Iraq a new name -- "Operation New Dawn" -- to reflect the reduced role U.S. troops will play in securing the country this year as troop levels fall, according to a memo from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.
Since U.S. forces charged across the Kuwaiti border toward Baghdad in 2003, the war has been known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The new name is scheduled to take effect in September, when U.S. troop levels are supposed to drop to about 50,000.
The change is intended to send a message that the U.S. military's combat role in Iraq is rapidly drawing to a close. In the Feb. 17 memo, Gates wrote to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top commander for the region, that the name change seeks to "recognize our evolving relationship with the Government of Iraq."
Such name changes are not unusual. The name of the 1991 Persian Gulf War changed as the mission changed, from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm and then finally to Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch.
The name change for the current conflict was first reported by ABC News, which posted the memo on its Web site. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed the decision.
NOTE: The following article discusses the name change and was written by Greg Jaffe. It appeared in the Washington Post on February 19, 2010.
War in Iraq will be called 'Operation New Dawn' to reflect reduced U.S. role
By Greg Jaffe
The Obama administration has decided to give the war in Iraq a new name -- "Operation New Dawn" -- to reflect the reduced role U.S. troops will play in securing the country this year as troop levels fall, according to a memo from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.
Since U.S. forces charged across the Kuwaiti border toward Baghdad in 2003, the war has been known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The new name is scheduled to take effect in September, when U.S. troop levels are supposed to drop to about 50,000.
The change is intended to send a message that the U.S. military's combat role in Iraq is rapidly drawing to a close. In the Feb. 17 memo, Gates wrote to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top commander for the region, that the name change seeks to "recognize our evolving relationship with the Government of Iraq."
Such name changes are not unusual. The name of the 1991 Persian Gulf War changed as the mission changed, from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm and then finally to Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch.
The name change for the current conflict was first reported by ABC News, which posted the memo on its Web site. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed the decision.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Elevating Development Assistance
By J. Brian Atwood
This is an except from an article that will be published in PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010).
J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert Humphrey Institute for Public Policy at the University of Minnesota and former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
References to the "3D approach," "whole of government," or "holistic approach" have become so pervasive in foreign policy, development, and national security circles that they have taken on the status of self-evident, common wisdom. In the following article, J. Brian Atwood discusses some of the tensions among the 3Ds and offers nuanced views on their further integration.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the "elevation" of the development mission and an end to the old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new "mindset" to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome reflection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues.
What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the difficult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality.
How does the administration define the word elevate in terms of resources, structure, and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. As someone who has held executive positions in both State and USAID, I want Secretary Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there are hurdles to overcome.
USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy administration, has been seen as the premier development agency within the international donor community. It led that community toward highly innovative interventions in economic reform, health, education, democracy/governance, agriculture, and the environment. These interventions and the evolution of a comprehensive, internationally accepted development strategy, backed by financial commitment, formed the basis of American leadership in development.
Click here to read the rest of the article.
This is an except from an article that will be published in PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010).
J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert Humphrey Institute for Public Policy at the University of Minnesota and former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
References to the "3D approach," "whole of government," or "holistic approach" have become so pervasive in foreign policy, development, and national security circles that they have taken on the status of self-evident, common wisdom. In the following article, J. Brian Atwood discusses some of the tensions among the 3Ds and offers nuanced views on their further integration.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the "elevation" of the development mission and an end to the old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new "mindset" to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome reflection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues.What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the difficult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality.
How does the administration define the word elevate in terms of resources, structure, and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. As someone who has held executive positions in both State and USAID, I want Secretary Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there are hurdles to overcome.
USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy administration, has been seen as the premier development agency within the international donor community. It led that community toward highly innovative interventions in economic reform, health, education, democracy/governance, agriculture, and the environment. These interventions and the evolution of a comprehensive, internationally accepted development strategy, backed by financial commitment, formed the basis of American leadership in development.
Click here to read the rest of the article.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review:
Today’s Wars Are Job One
In Monday’s news briefing on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary Gates stated that "achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, policy, and program priorities."The objective of prevailing in current wars is obviously a major departure from the longstanding force-sizing construct of planning for two major theater wars. But it also was a discussion point over a year ago in Joint Force Quarterly, when John Nagl and Gian Gentile debated the long-term implications and wisdom of a focus on counterinsurgency doctrine and training for the U.S. Army. You can revisit the argument here:
John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 20.
Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 27.
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
JFQ figures into testimony
The Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen this morning on the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. While questioning Admiral Mullen, Senator Jeff Sessions (R–AL) referred to an essay published in issue 55 of Joint Force Quarterly."The Efficacy of 'Don’t Ask, Don't Tell'" was written by Colonel Om Prakash, USAF, while he was a student at the National War College. The essay won the 2009 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and, along with the winning essays in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition, was published in Joint Force Quarterly. You can read Colonel Prakash’s essay here:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/14.pdf
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