NDU Press Blog

Bin Laden’s Legacy: Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror

2011-09-15T10:21:00.001-04:00

Bin Laden’s Legacy: Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
John Wiley, 2011
288 pp. $25.95
ISBN: 978–1–11809–494–5

Reviewed by Diana Wueger

Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, “If you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles. If you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.” In Bin Laden’s Legacy: Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross argues that despite Osama bin Laden’s position atop America’s Most Wanted list for over a decade, the United States has never made a serious effort to understand his—and, by extension, al Qaeda’s—strategy. As a result, we have assumed the role of George Foreman in his famous match with Muhammad Ali; the harder we hit, the more we wear ourselves out as al Qaeda leans back against the ropes and waits.

Gartenstein-Ross provides a wide-ranging synopsis of America’s decade-long struggle against al Qaeda. Over the course of the book, he lays out the missteps the United States has made in its prosecution of the war on terror, beginning with the most fundamental mistake: U.S. inability or unwillingness to consider al Qaeda’s strategy when formulating its responses. According to the author, “[al Qaeda’s] strategy could be known through a nuanced look at bin Laden’s personal history and thought. Even at the time of 9/11, it was clear that bin Laden believed it was essential to undermine the economy of his superpower foe and to make the battlefield on which the American had to fight as broad as possible. U.S. strategic documents analyzing al Qaeda reveal a lack of awareness of these twin goals” (p. 35).

This lack of awareness of al Qaeda’s interest in weakening the American economy led to a decade of intense politicization of national security, which in turn created a culture in which any amount of spending could be justified in the name of fighting terror. Gartenstein-Ross documents the gross mismanagement of funds, duplication of effort across agencies, and minimal oversight of contractors. This resource inefficiency was most clearly on display in the Department of Homeland Security, where the combination of multi-billion-dollar budgets, tight deadlines, and intense pressure to do something without clear priorities led to massive cost overruns. As the author points out, this wasteful and inefficient spending was itself a boon to al Qaeda in its efforts to drive up the cost to the United States.

The other element of al Qaeda’s strategy involved broadening the battlefield. The United States eagerly embraced this approach without realizing that doing so played into al Qaeda’s hands. In 2002, President George W. Bush said that “the best way to keep America safe from terrorism is to go after terrorists where they plan and hide” (p. 13). This was exactly what bin Laden wanted; by inducing the United States to fight outside its borders, he understood that there would be long-term costs that would put further economic pressure on America. While the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity, as al Qaeda safe havens would have continued to pose systemic risks to America, Gartenstein-Ross excoriates the Bush administration for the Iraq war, calling it “naïve best-case scenario thinking” that “would erode American power and provide al Qaeda with a remarkable opportunity to regroup” (pp. 101–102). By adding a new battlefield that was previously unconnected to terrorist activity, U.S. policymakers ratcheted up the costs while providing al Qaeda’s leadership time to regroup as the military pulled back in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Throughout Bin Laden’s Legacy, Gartenstein-Ross repeatedly returns to our failure to treat al Qaeda’s leaders as people capable of sophisticated strategic thought. Bin Laden believed that “economic power was the source of U.S. military might, and thus . . . saw weakening the economy as a critical aspect of victory” (p. 9). Through al Qaeda, he promulgated the idea of driving up costs as a way to bring America down; today, we face an enemy that knows we will respond to every attack by increasing our spending. Yet as Gartenstein-Ross argues, we have not treated jihadi terrorists as enemies worthy of understanding. Instead, we have focused on the tactic of terrorism without probing what al Qaeda hoped to gain through its use.

Urgent without being alarmist and eminently readable, Bin Laden’s Legacy is a testament to Gartenstein-Ross’s deep knowledge of his field and his capacity to cut through feeble arguments to lay out only the most salient evidence. His legal training combines neatly with his moderate, academic approach to produce arguments so logical that they seem obvious at first glace; only later does the reader realize this is a fresh read on the past 10 years of counterterrorism efforts.

If there is fault to be found, it is in the final chapter, in which the author lays out a roadmap for future efforts against AQ, its branches and franchises, and jihadi terrorism more broadly. The scope of the effort, however, is too great for a single chapter in a 300-page book. While individual recommendations such as finding a liquid fuel alternative to oil or implementing civil service reform may be necessary, Gartenstein-Ross fails to elucidate how America can achieve those goals. As the author points out, path dependence has the United States firmly in its grip; it will be hard to retool our approach at this late date, and there is insufficient practical guidance in Bin Laden’s Legacy to consider this a guidebook for future counterterrorism efforts.

Nevertheless, as improbable as it may once have seemed, al Qaeda’s goal of crippling the United States is achievable if we refuse to recognize our weaknesses and take a hard look at our unsustainable security structures and our untenable fiscal situation. Indeed, the biggest threat to our security and our way of life may very well be us. Al Qaeda cannot reasonably be blamed for the housing bubble bursting or the debt ceiling crisis, but the combined weight of our self-generated economic misfortunes and the long-term costs of our wars of choice leave us with little spare capacity to respond to the threats we still face from a nimble, adaptive enemy. Bin Laden’s Legacy lays bare al Qaeda’s strategy; the question now is whether we will be able to adapt to face it.

Diana Wueger is a freelance writer based in Washington, DC, covering international and domestic security issues.

Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947

2011-09-12T16:07:00.002-04:00

Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947
by Andrew M. Roe
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010
328 pp. $34.95
ISBN: 978–0–7006–1699–2

Reviewed by Todd M. Manyx

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers, Osama Bin Laden, along with senior members of his al Qaeda terror group, decamped his safe haven in Afghanistan for a location believed to be in Waziristan, a remote, mountainous area of northwestern Pakistan. It is a region of fiercely independent tribes that have refused to submit to outside governance for centuries and that today are part of Pakistan’s semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is particularly well known within the British military as the home of the Fakir of Ipi, an Islamic extremist in the early 20th century, who was the subject of intensive British manhunt efforts consisting of up to 40,000 troops scouring the countryside between 1936 and 1947. The Fakir was never caught and lived out his days in the region, ultimately dying a natural death in 1960.

In his inaugural book, Andrew Roe has taken on a region of the world that is obscure to most people not concerned with the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, despite the remoteness of the region involved, Roe has combined his significant practical experience as a British infantry officer and former Afghan Army kandak (battalion) mentor with an academic’s sense of history derived from his postgraduate and doctoral studies of the area to bring us a book of substance that should appeal to historians, military professionals, and policy planners.

In establishing the purpose for his book, Roe is guided by Shakespeare’s assertion that “what’s past is prologue.” In particular, Roe is convinced that we need to examine the British experience in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries for policies that were developed through trial and error and that have been the guiding principal for administration of the FATA for nearly a century. In the end, the raison d'être for this book is that Roe strongly believes that history and culture matter and that the “many . . . hard-earned lessons from Waziristan can be adopted as part of a contemporary solution” (p. 14).

Recognizing that “there is a lack of contemporary literature” (p. 6) on Waziristan, Roe has organized his book into three principal areas: a regional background, an overview of the British military and civilian government experience, and an analysis of modern parallels between the colonial period and present-day issues along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The first two chapters provide the historical context defining the grindstone upon which the British would simultaneously sharpen their troops’ proficiency in counterinsurgency warfare and wear down their own political resolve to dominate the tribes. Principal factors influencing the tribal mentality include the unmatched harshness of the terrain, the intense isolation of the people, and the unwavering dictates of the Pashtunwali code of honor.

Roe is particularly adept at explaining the importance of differentiating between the isolated and independent tribes, categorized as nang (honor) tribes in which individual independence was of paramount importance and which were characterized by “proud and uncooperative self-government” (p. 41) and the qalang (rent/tax) tribes characterized by strong centralized leadership. As he notes, “The psychological difference between the . . . tribes . . . was stark” (p. 39). In describing the region’s major tribes, Roe’s descriptions of the Waziris (for whom the region is named) and the Mahsuds hold as true today as they were 150 years ago when one official described the tribes as “the largest known potential reservoir of guerrilla fighters in the world” (p. 59).

The subsequent six chapters provide an exceedingly detailed recounting of the specific policy and military efforts undertaken between 1849 and 1947. Reminiscent of Peter Hopkirk’s seminal work, The Great Game, Roe draws from an extensive number of primary government sources, unit histories, memoirs, and news accounts of the day to recount Great Britain’s efforts to secure the northwest border of the Empire’s “crown jewel,” India. Without reexamining Roe’s detailed analysis, this section of the book will be most appreciated by historians and those interested in the fine details of British northwest frontier policy formation. It is an excellent recounting of the politics and practicalities associated with evolving and implementing the close border policy, the forward policy and maliki (tribal leader) system, and the modified forward policy.

The crux of these different systems lies in how they addressed the issue of “rule” with the tribes. As the British quickly learned, the tribes were excellent guerrilla fighters who would never quit. The resulting policy changes eventually led to a policy of cooption and containment in which the government utilized heavy subsidization to influence malikis to accept those benchmarks deemed to be “good enough” (p. 196) in attaining Great Britain’s goals, and to realize the importance of cultural experts and experienced political officers who could negotiate with the tribal leaders.

The final chapters summarize the lessons learned during this period and offer an analysis of how contemporary parallels exist between the two eras. On the whole, these chapters represent an unnatural flow from the rest of the book; however, they are the most relevant from a policy and planning perspective. As mentioned, within the author’s analysis, there are no perfect solutions, yet “[d]espite a varied record of success, the British approach to tribal control was adopted by the Pakistan state at independence” (p. 193)—an approach that remained little changed until President Pervez Musharraf, pressured by the United States, began to modify how the Pakistan government approached the now-restive tribal areas.

In the final analysis, Roe is clear in noting that current issues such as the role of a reality-based policy informed by clear cultural understanding, the challenges of the disputed border as represented by the Durand Line, and the need for a civil-military relationship that is both flexible and responsive to changes on the ground and that “employs all the elements of national power” (p. 256), are necessary in establishing a policy that effectively works to resolve the issues of distrust, politics, and pride that guide tribal interests.

As the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States work to counter Islamic extremists, particularly along the ill-defined border derived from the Durand Line, the region of Waziristan will continue to be, as much now as it was a century ago, central to resolving the issue. Success will not be achieved through attainment of Western government–dictated standards. Instead, it will be accomplished by realizing that the tribes must be consulted and their preexisting structures used.

One of the advantages of the modern age is that while we may not live to be 500 years old, there is no reason we cannot have a 500-year-old mind. History is replete with lessons to be learned if only we take the time to study them. In this case, the consequences of failing to draw on the lessons of our predecessors cannot be known. However, despite having put “payment received” on Osama bin Laden’s personal debt to society, we can almost be guaranteed that without drawing from the British government’s 19^th-century playbook, the past, if perceived as prologue, will ensure that senior insurgent leaders will likely—much like the Fakir of Ipi—die of old age in the safety of Waziristan’s remote hills and protective tribes.

Major Todd M. Manyx, USMC, is a Marine Corps Intelligence Officer assigned to the Commander’s Action Group, U.S. Central Command.

Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign against Al Qaeda

2011-09-02T09:56:00.001-04:00

Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign against Al Qaeda
by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker
Henry Holt and Company, 2011
324 pp., $27.00
IBSN: 978–0–8050–9103–8

Students and practitioners of national security strategy have long talked about the importance of uniting all instruments of national power. Nowhere is this initiative deemed more urgent than in the campaign against transnational terror organizations and al Qaeda. With stellar access to all levels of Federal authority, authors Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker provide an unprecedented view of how the U.S. Government, across two administrations, has embraced and partially succeeded in creating a whole-of-government strategy to the 21st century’s most salient threat.

Schmitt and Shanker have cast the story of America’s fight against al Qaeda as it has been waged—at the national strategic level—while also attending to the tactical actions, where Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen stand shoulder to shoulder with intelligence agency analysts and Federal Government professionals from the Justice, State and Treasury Departments. Counterstrike is a satisfying tale that weaves the actions and commitment of those professionals with the comments and determination of well-known leaders, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. It is a story of the President pushing his agency chiefs to overcome their bureaucratic turf battles to work better together. One example of that success is when an Army lieutenant leads his platoon near Taji, Iraq, detains a terror leader, and seizes a major treasure trove of al Qaeda’s information on networks and communications. The information spread throughout the U.S. Government, enabling scores of follow-on successful operations.

Schmitt and Shanker’s best work, however, captures the evolution of national counterterror strategy. Early on, it was axiomatic that terrorists could not be deterred. The fatalistic perspective made many long for the more binary Cold War era and resulted in the crafting of a less-than-optimal counterterror strategy. The authors trace the transformation of deterrence from a rejected concept to a central pillar in the U.S. strategy against al Qaeda. As U.S. officials at all levels began to understand al Qaeda better, they appreciated that suicide bombers valued success and the praise of family. By working to isolate suicide attackers so that they killed only themselves and by launching information campaigns to discredit the bomber in the eyes of Islam and their families after the attack, policymakers enacted measures to influence suicide attacks at the tactical level.

In parallel, others options became apparent to deter transnational terror operations. Terror networks required terrain from which to operate. As American officials recognized the Northwest Territories of Pakistan as al Qaeda’s new sanctuary, they went to great lengths to cajole and warn Pakistani political and military leaders that any attack on the United States that was traced back to this area would elicit an overwhelming U.S. military response. When this message was delivered personally by President Barack Obama to a Pakistani delegation in a staged impromptu meeting in October 2010, General Ashfaq Kayani got the message. Thus, the United States embraced a deterrent strategy evolved from its Cold War experience and targeted the perpetrator on a personal level and those entities that enabled them on a national level.

The strategy to counterterror networks with global reach requires robust and agile intelligence. General Stan McChrystal captured it perfectly when he said, “Every operation is a fight for intelligence.” The authors show the balanced decisionmaking that U.S. leaders must now confront when they uncover terror operatives: let the operatives continue to operate, permitting a conduit into the terror network, or strike to remove them, possibly lose the opportunity for insight into the organization.

Perhaps nowhere are the challenges of deterrence and exploitation/shutdown of the terror network greater than in the cyber world of the Internet. Counterstrike captures the cat-and-mouse nature of stalking and blocking terror activities in the gray virtual world. With eye-opening revelations, the authors share a few of the successes that the United States has enjoyed in this realm that make the Iron Curtain–era espionage seems like child’s play.

The story culminates appropriately with the Abbottabad raid in May 2011 that killed Osama bin Laden. In this operation, the well-coordinated, fully integrated instruments of U.S. power were focused and effective. As the Central Intelligence Agency and special operations team descended on the objective, their operation was the direct result of a debate among the President’s national security team on how to proceed—Predator strikes, B–2 bombing, a joint U.S.-Pakistani raid, or a U.S.-only elite raid. There is something satisfying in the realization that the fabric of national security is woven with threads from as many elements of the U.S. Government as possible—and Abbottabad reflected the successful interconnection of many efforts.
Those who serve in Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Federal Government will notice that the authors do not dwell on the impact the Iraqi operation had on efforts to battle al Qaeda. Those policy struggles are worthy of a separate book unto itself.

Counterstrike’s greatest value is not just capturing the rise of deterrence theory in counterterror strategy or an appreciation of the importance of cyber operations. Rather, it showcases the determination and commitment of countless individuals throughout all levels of the Federal and military service to get the job done. From the sergeant on patrol to the analyst in an agency on the Potomac River to the member of the National Security Council: all contribute.

Col Michael Isherwood, USAF (Ret.), served 24 years and commanded at the squadron through wing level while logging more than 3,000 hours in A–10 and F–16 aircraft. Among his staff assignments including serving as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His last deployment was to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, in 2005–2006.

New JFQ Editor Completes the Joinup

2011-01-04T11:49:00.004-05:00

Dr. William T. Eliason (Colonel, USAF, Ret.) joined the Joint Force Quarterly team as the journal’s Editor in November 2010, and he is already hard at work shaping the first issue that will bear his name on the masthead (Issue 61, 2^d Quarter 2011). In advance of that debut, we invited Dr. Eliason to answer a few questions about what readers might expect to see in the journal on his watch.

Naturally, you have been a regular reader of JFQ throughout your military career. What do you think have been the journal’s strong and weak points? Do you have any plans to remake its look or tone?

WTE: One of the best rules I have had when being the “new guy” is to hold off on immediate changes in operations until I get a good sense of where the organization is going. Obviously, JFQ has been highly successful over the past 60 issues, but I also know that the media world the Chairman’s journal lives in has undergone dramatic changes since JFQ began in 1993. What remains a constant and will continue for the foreseeable future is the JFQ mission set down by General Colin Powell when he initiated the journal. Admiral Mullen has repeatedly expressed his view that the pages of JFQ will contain a lively, honest and informed discussion of the issues facing the joint force.

Fortunately, JFQ does get a nearly constant flow of articles for our review. But I also see my new position as an opportunity to do all I can to encourage readers, regardless of rank, Service, nationality, or specialty, to send us their best work. I will look for engaging pieces that are well written and will interest the joint force. So far, I have been very impressed by the volume and range of issues our readers are willing to send to us. The quality is also very high, so we will be able to continue to select the best of the best to include in future issues, which is exactly the way it should be.

You will be the first editor of Joint Force Quarterly to hold a Ph.D. (International Studies, Old Dominion University), and your most recent position was as Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School [JAWS]. Do you expect that your immersion in academia will bring a different perspective to JFQ?

WTE: Well, anyone who has gone through over a decade of undergraduate and graduate schools as I have would likely call the experience something other than an “immersion.” I have spent time in combat both in and out of a classroom! The good news for future contributors to JFQ is that I will hold tight to the simple principles of the following questions I asked my JAWS students about their writing:

1) Who wants to read this? (Audience)
2) What is your piece about? (Joint issue, history, book review)
3) Why is it important? (The reader’s time should not be wasted)
4) What can you suggest we do about this issue?

A simplified list: Who? What? So what? Now what? Add in graduate-quality writing on an issue of direct and significant relevance to the joint community, and a prospective author stands a high probability of getting published in JFQ. None of these are new or my creation, just good common sense rules for writers who want to get their ideas in print.

My last 7 years on Active Duty were spent in a combatant command and later teaching joint professional military education, so I am thoroughly familiar with the Joint community and its issues. That I have a complete and recent understanding of what adult learners go through to earn a doctorate helps me have a large amount of empathy for the writer’s challenge. I look to our readers to continue to help us provide new and interesting ideas that inform and educate the members of the joint force we serve.

You have extensive joint and combined operational experience in the Air Force, which undoubtedly has fattened your Rolodex with military and civilian contacts worldwide. Do you plan to tap into your network of colleagues and contacts to enrich JFQ, and if so, how?

WTE: My email has been increasingly active as word of my new position spreads among friends from all Services who were part of my first career. I am sure I will make many more as I reach out to the joint community. I am planning on initially targeting the staff and war colleges, including the advanced warfighting schools, both Service and joint, as they are daily engaged in trying to tease out the answers to the very issues JFQ has and will offer to a wider audience. I also am working in one of the most dynamic and plugged-in research centers in DOD here at National Defense University, where some of the world’s leading minds are working a wide range of important issues that frequently can and will be of interest to the JFQ audience.

As I get settled, I intend to reenergize and expand my contacts within the U.S. and international military communities as well as academia, and the think tanks both here in Washington and around the world. My view is very much global and has been shaped by my overseas experiences, my academic interests, and my constant need to learn more about the world and how it works. My guess is the level of inputs to my inbox will be directly related to my ability to get people to share their thoughts. I hope to encourage contributions on an ever widening discussion of issues that matter to today’s and tomorrow’s joint warfighting leaders. In the journal business, I am told, you can’t have too many readers or contributors.

Joint Force Quarterly is, of course, the “Chairman’s journal.” What is your interpretation of what that means? Is the journal’s mission simply to disseminate the Chairman’s vision? To help inform it by highlighting issues of interest and concern to strategists and operators that need to be brought to his attention? Both? Neither?

WTE: My read through the history of JFQ indicates that every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has held firm to General Powell’s original intent for JFQ: “We want the pages of JFQ to be filled with the latest word on joint issues. . . . We want the discussion of these joint issues to get a thorough airing, to stir debate and counterargument, to stimulate the thinking of American men and women serving on land, at sea, and in the air.” I will do all I can to place high-quality writing on joint issues in pages of JFQ whether in print or on-line at a level that gets readers to do what every Chairman wants interested readers to do: “Pick up JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively interplay among some of the finest minds committed to the profession of arms” (JFQ Issue 1, Summer 1993, page 5). Having met with some of the key advisors to the current Chairman, I understand that he continues to believe strongly in General Powell’s original design and wishes to follow success with success. In 2011, we will look to update the original 1993 guidelines to assure that JFQ is a facilitator of honest, informed, and rigorous discussion about the major issues of national security and defense policy confronting the joint force today.

I truly believe the value of JFQ to the joint force has been directly tied to the ability of my predecessors to constantly meet or exceed General Powell’s vision. To be honest, this challenge is what interested me most about the job.

Anything else you'd like us to know?

WTE: At JFQ, we are about seeking discussion of the important issues that impact the ability of the U.S. military and our allies and friends to succeed in their mission. We know that many readers of JFQ have good ideas, important points of view, and the basic tools needed to put together an article for us to publish. Whether it is an issue piece, a history piece, or a book review, we are ready to give you an honest shot at making yourself heard. So I suggest everyone who reads this interview to do what my dissertation mentor urged me to do: write, write early, and write often—but write! Make sure your work answers the questions I suggested: who, what, so what, now what. Then send it to the Chairman’s—and your—journal: Joint Force Quarterly.

— Interview by L.M. Yambrick

NDU Press Holiday Scavenger Hunt - PART TWO

2010-12-16T11:27:00.000-05:00

The second part of the NDU Press Holiday Scavenger Hunt kicked off today. We've hidden virtual "easter eggs" throughout the NDU Press website. A virtual easter egg is an intentional hidden message or feature in an object, such as a Web page. The easter eggs will be planted in graphics and text, which users can click to win prizes. Some easter eggs will only be viewable from specific browsers, adding to the challenge. Other easter eggs will highlight experimental CSS techniques pioneered by developers such as Andy Clarke and Eric Meyer. Those participants that find an easter egg will win a prize.

Clues will be posted on our Facebook and Twitter page and new graphics will appear daily, so check back often! Prizes include a signed copy of Partnership for the Americas by Admiral James G. Stavridis, photographic prints of the National Defense University by Tara Parekh, NDU apparel, and subscriptions to Joint Force Quarterly and PRISM.

The NDU Press scavenger hunt is part of an ongoing Department of Defense–wide effort to shift to a more participatory Web. NDU Press is taking a Web 2.0 attitude, focusing on feedback and collaboration—in addition to first-class information.

There are a few rules:

If you're an NDU employee you can play, but not if you helped put together the scavenger hunt.
You can find as many easter eggs as you want, but you will only receive one prize. The more easter eggs you find, the better prize you will receive.
Don't share where you found the easter eggs!
The Scavenger Hunt will close noon (EST) on December 22, 2010.

Click here to read the press release. Good luck and happy hunting!

NDU Press Holiday Scavenger Hunt - PART ONE

2010-12-14T12:03:00.008-05:00

Beginning Tuesday, December 14, the National Defense University Press (NDU Press) will be hosting a holiday scavenger hunt to highlight its Web site and publications. The event kicks off at 12:00 p.m. EDT. The first question will be posted to the NDU Press Facebook page.

Participants will have to search the NDU Press website for the answer. The answer will appear embedded in a link on the site. You will know that you have found the answer, because the link will be red and bold.

Here is an example:
U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual is still widely read by military and civilian government officials alike more than 70 years after its publication.

When you click on the red link, you will be taken to a page that contains a KEYWORD and a clue leading you to the next page in the hunt. Remember to keep track of the KEYWORDS!

There are a total of 9 KEYWORDS. The first 10 people to send all KEYWORDS in the right order to NDUPress@ndu.edu will win a prize. Prizes include a signed copy of Partnership for the Americas by Admiral James G. Stavridis, photographic prints of the National Defense University by Tara Parekh, NDU apparel, and subscriptions to Joint Force Quarterly and PRISM.

There are a few rules:

If you're an NDU employee you can play, but not if you helped put together the scavenger hunt.
You can submit as many e-mails as you want, but only one correct answer per person will be considered for a prize.
Don't post your answers where other people can read them!
When you're ready to submit your answers, e-mail them to NDUPress@ndu.edu.
The Scavenger Hunt will be open from noon (EST) on December 14 to noon (EST) on December 16, 2010.

Click here to read the press release. Good luck and happy hunting!

December 7, 1941

2010-12-07T15:56:00.002-05:00

Off the (Electronic) Shelf: A Review Essay by Jonathan Newell

2010-11-16T14:25:00.005-05:00

Today’s entry, a review essay of two recent books about U.S. treatment of prisoners of war, is by First Lieutenant Jonathan E. Newell, USAR, who is completing his application for Active-duty chaplaincy. Along with the essay, he submitted several photos with the following explanation: "I recently had the opportunity to serve as a chaplain for a remembrance ceremony for World War II German and Italian POWs buried at the Fort Devens, Massachusetts, cemetery. I’ve attached a few photos from the ceremony highlighting the fact that the legacy of POW treatment still forms a powerful bond between our countries." Ceremonies such as this one—a recognition of the tribulations endured and sacrifices made by enemy soldiers of a war whose diplomatic wounds have long since healed, no matter how virulent and existential our nation’s differences once were—can speak volumes about that legacy.

Read the review essay here:
A Review Essay by Jonathan Newell

Moving Heaven and (Rare) Earth

2010-11-04T16:05:00.009-04:00

The Pentagon’s Office of Industrial Policy is preparing to release the results of a year-long study that concluded that China’s monopoly on rare earth minerals does not pose a threat to U.S. national security. China produces 97 percent of the world’s rare earths, a group of 17 metals used in the production of military equipment such as radar, night-vision goggles, and precision-guided bombs. However, worldwide uncertainty about China’s intention to reduce exports of the materials has prompted several countries to move toward ending their dependence on Chinese production. Japan is planning to mine rare earth minerals in Vietnam, and India is accelerating geological surveys and mapping of its own possible reserves. The Pentagon study reportedly suggests that loans and incentives might be offered to U.S. providers of rare earth minerals to bolster domestic supply.

In “China’s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements” (Joint Force Quarterly 59, 4th Quarter 2010), LCDR Cindy Hurst urged the U.S. military to consider the possibility that China could capitalize on its decades of experience and work with rare earth metals to pull ahead of the United States in the military technology race. But Dr. Amory B. Lovins, cofounder, chairman, and chief scientist at the Rocky Mountain Institute and also a contributor to Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 57, 2d Quarter 2010), is more optimistic about the prospects that alternative technologies offer the United States. He explains in this letter to the editor of Joint Force Quarterly, as well as offering the following two suggestions for additional readings about the rare earths situation:

Dr. Jon Hykawy, Arun Thomas, and Gabriela Casasnovas, "Rare Earth Elements: Pick Your Spots, Carefully," Byron Capital Markets report, March 25, 2010 and Walt Benecki, "What Rare Earth Crisis?" Magnetics & Technology Magazine (Winter 2009).

—L.M. Yambrick

Click here to read the letter to the editor by Dr. Amory B. Lovins.

Comment from Dr. Jon Hykawy

November 8, 2010

Dr. Lovins,

At the risk of stepping into a discussion that our work was not meant to address, I wanted to elaborate on a few of the concepts you have discussed below.

We agree that a bubble in rare earth stocks has developed. Adhering as closely as possible to the scientific method, my definition of a stock-market bubble is a situation in which all stocks associated with a particular sector or concept rise or fall, regardless of the value of their underlying assets. Byron Capital Markets maintains a rare earths index, not with the intent of feeding the hype, but to help us determine whether or not there is too much exuberance manifesting in the market. It would appear the rare earths space is currently experiencing such a bubble and level of exuberance. But bubbles can persist for an extended period of time, and as long as capital continues to flow to the sector, we would agree with the conclusion in the DoD study that rare earths do not present a critical strategic challenge for the US military.

We also agree that there are substitutes available. Indeed, we would suggest that the options available for extending the available supply of rare earths should include both substitution and mitigation. For example, the major uses of dysprosium and terbium are likely to be as alloying agents in NdFeB alloy magnets, to raise the effective operating temperature of these parts, as outlined in LCDR Hurst’s JFQ article. And yes, we can substitute ferrite magnets or other motor designs to remove the need for rare earth magnets, likely at a penalty of volume, weight and power/efficiency. There is good research being done in Japan and Korea (and likely elsewhere, but these are the programs of which I am aware) to effectively decrease the use of dysprosium and terbium in magnets with little to no penalty in physical characteristics by processing of the magnet alloys, a form of mitigation; we want the magnet to work at elevated temperatures, we do not care if this can be done with or without Dy and Tb. But we can also mitigate the base issue; in the case of rare earth magnets operating at elevated temperature, we can also work to more effectively cool the magnets, an engineering issue rather than a materials issue, and yet a direction that could provide a significant decrease in material use. Combined, we believe all these options may well result in being able to do much more in industry with the rare earths we can lay our hands on.

However, we do not agree there is no cause for alarm. Substitution and mitigation take time, and China currently owns the only available supply. While the capital markets are willing to finance rare earths mines at present, this market bubble is not likely to persist forever. There is little understanding in the capital markets regarding the rare earths value chain, and the need for separation/purification facilities outside of China, the need for metallization and alloying capability globally, and the amount of profit that each one of these operations can generate. Without separation, metallization and alloying, magnet makers outside China will simply not receive product they can use, regardless of whether the raw rare earths are being extracted from the ground or not. Rare earths within and without China are rising in cost, and while many have not yet reached historical highs, this may well be achieved with the next round of quotas from the Chinese.

I am not any sort of conspiracy theorist, and would not bill myself as a China expert. I have done a fair bit of work with Chinese companies, government people and businessmen. I would point out that one must parse official statements from Chinese officials very carefully before beginning to celebrate. The Chinese have recently made statements to the effect that rare earths will not become a bargaining chip; that can be read two ways. They have stated that, contrary to an earlier indication of a further 30% reduction in export quotas in the coming year, the quotas will not be reduced further; but it was not clear in anything I read whether this stable quota is based on a 2010 annualized level or on the run-rate quotas established in the latter half of 2010, which were significantly lower than 2010 average rates. And I would add that our belief is that we will see a modified quota system from the Chinese in the near term, one designed to alleviate the very high prices of lanthanum and cerium outside China. If a new system is designed that, at minimum, establishes separate quota levels for La and Ce and all other rare earths, it is trivial to set values for each segment that maintains export quotas in tonnes but severely curtails the shipment of magnet materials and heavy rare earth elements from China. Given that we believe China’s main goal in limiting export of rare earths, whether by methods against WTO guidelines such as export quotas or within WTO guidelines (albeit perhaps not within the bounds of what China is allowed to do as a relatively new member of the WTO) as punitive export tariffs and taxes, is the importation of higher-value jobs to China, their goal should be to keep raw magnet materials and raw heavy rare earths within their borders. There is more than one way to skin that cat.

Our original report suggested that while most light rare earths would be in relatively good supply in future, some heavy elements were likely to become scarce. We stand by that opinion. We continue to believe that the US should make the electrification of transportation a national strategic imperative, and not solely due to environmental concerns but largely because your nation spends some $300 billion per year buying foreign oil, weakening your currency and indirectly supporting regimes that, quite simply, do not have your best interests at heart. Rare earths are a currently necessary part of the electrification of transportation, and at present price points are likely to continue to be a desirable part of that change, as well as many other industries. While we do not believe these materials present a major crisis to your military, that does not necessarily make them an afterthought in many other sectors of your economy.

Regards,

Dr. Jon Hykawy

Off the (Electronic) Shelf: Patricia Olney Reviews Martin Edwin Andersen’s Peoples of the Earth

2010-11-01T08:31:00.007-04:00

Peoples of the Earth: Ethnonationalism, Democracy, and the Indigenous Challenge in "Latin" America
By Martin Edwin Andersen
Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010
296 pp. $70.00
ISBN: 978–0–7391–4391–9

Reviewed by
DR. PATRICIA OLNEY

Peoples of the Earth is probably the most honest and comprehensive examination and analysis available of the dozens of indigenous social movements that have erupted in the Western Hemisphere since the end of the Cold War. In this volume, Andersen establishes both the threat and the opportunities that indigenous mobilizations represent. He argues that accommodating their demands for sovereignty over their territories and lives, and their pleas for a more just distribution of resources, is not only imperative from a moral and democratic perspective, but is also demanded from a strategic one. His arguments may be seen as sympathetic toward indigenous peoples, but he shows how their interests and those of the countries in the region are mostly complementary and represent a positive sum game. Meanwhile, the costs of not accommodating their demands could include the spread of anti-American populist regimes, alliances between indigenous and radical leftist and/or Islamic groups, and the eruption of violence. Andersen suggests that left unheeded, indigenous movements could represent an existential threat to individual states and to the region at large. He therefore recommends making them strategic allies and bringing indigenous peoples into the democratic fold, making each country’s democracy more inclusive.

Andersen starts by framing the rise of indigenous movements as a result of a "global decolonization" process triggered in the wake of post–Cold War democratization. The combination of the emergence of a powerful international human rights lobby and a transnational global network facilitating indigenous organizing helped create opportunities for indigenous peoples to express their demands. One of the main reasons Andersen believes Latin American governments have resisted accommodating indigenous demands is because they misunderstand both the nature of the movements and the realities they represent, partly due to longstanding practices of paternalism and racism. Conflating leftist movements and indigenous ones, for example, can lead them to be seen as Cold War–style communist threats, when in fact their demands are quite distinct from those of the leftist movements latching onto them. Andersen notes, for example, that indigenous peoples do not oppose globalization or free markets as do radical leftists, but in fact they only challenge free trade agreements affecting resources situated on their territories. They join forces with leaders like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's Evo Morales because of the exclusionary policies of more liberal national elites.

The author also believes that a widely held fear—that granting indigenous peoples autonomy over their territories represents a threat to national sovereignty—is a misunderstanding. He suggests that once their demands are accommodated, indigenous peoples will work with the state in ways that will actually enhance national sovereignty. In sum, he argues that, at least in some cases, accommodating indigenous peoples demands may be the best safeguard against the threats he identifies, and that it could both reinforce sovereignty and deepen democracy.

In both the concept-oriented chapters of Part I and the six case studies in Part II, Andersen provides many examples of potential security threats that could arise as a result of the continued exclusion of indigenous peoples. Perhaps the greatest threat emanates from the overlap between indigenous peoples, natural resources, and weak or failing states. Andersen never pretends to have all of the answers, but he suggests that states' refusal to accommodate indigenous peoples' demands risks their radicalization and eventual alliance with anti-American groups, including radical Islamic groups. He provides several facts to support this claim. First, there are ideological similarities that may explain why Islam is spreading rapidly throughout the region. Second, he points to Israeli intelligence reports of Hizballah’s intention of working through indigenous peoples to establish a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. There is also the conversion to Islam of the Venezuelan Wayuu tribe led by Teodoro Darnott, who claims to head "Hizballah Latin America."

Andersen rightly points out that indigenous peoples have been locked out by exclusionary elites. He discusses external actors involved in movements that could threaten states and, from a strategic standpoint, appears to purposefully leave the reader with unanswered questions. For example, given the levels of crime and misery he reveals on reservations in developed countries, and the example of a secessionist movement in Nicaragua, why is autonomy a better strategy than assimilation for promoting the welfare of indigenous peoples and the security of the country? Also, does empowering weak and unassimilated actors in weak states necessarily enhance security? This book helps the careful reader to consider, if not address, such challenging questions.

Peoples of the Earth is a well-written, encyclopedic account of the indigenous awakening in the Western Hemisphere. The book is unique in that it represents the highest quality in social science, yet still provides all of the information needed by analysts to see the wide range of security threats posed by indigenous activism and state responses in the Western Hemisphere. It is well worth reading and could lead to the formulation of proactive security strategies that neutralize the explosive potential of this post–Cold War phenomenon.

Dr. Patricia Olney is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Connecticut State University and specializes in Latin American security issues.

Sri Lanka: COIN or Civil War?

2010-10-28T11:40:00.003-04:00

Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks, a veteran of 40 years in the Foreign Service and currently a Distinguished Senior Fellow at George Mason University, contacted Joint Force Quarterly with comments about “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers” by Niel A. Smith, which appeared in issue 59 (4th Quarter, 2010). Ambassador Marks believes that MAJ Smith misreads the context of the Sri Lankan government’s conflict with the Tamil Tigers.

“Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers” by Major Niel Smith contains much of interest but, unfortunately, can be misleading to readers not familiar with Sri Lanka and the conflict in question. Potentially the most serious misunderstanding is the author’s attempt to put the Sri Lankan conflict into a COIN context. As far as back mid-1980s, the LTTE controlled territory, administratively as well as militarily. Therefore, the central conflict—or center of gravity to use a term popular in American military circles—was much more of a civil war between two territorially defined combatants, not a “counterinsurgency” against guerrillas. The Sri Lankan government’s final victory was not a COIN success but a fairly classic kinetic campaign across clearly identified battlelines. There was no hearts and minds campaign, no reestablishment of government authority against night-time raiders. While the LTTE certainly used terrorist tactics and mounted numerous special operations across the frontlines, the essential conflict was at those battles. The government’s victory was due to having finally mustered the will and the conventional forces to conduct a successful offensive.

Clausewitz emphasized that the first requirement is to understand the character of the conflict in question. To call the Sri Lankan conflict an insurgency rather than a secession is to misclassify it. The LTTE was not trying to subvert or overthrow the Sri Lankan government but to secede from it—more like the American Civil War than anything else.

This misunderstanding, common enough among many observers, was and is due to several causes. First, by missing the fact that from the mid-1980s, the LTTE controlled territory and operated from it in a fairly classic way, although the battlelines shifted from time to time. Then the LTTE use of terrorism (in fact, they invented the suicide bomber) and other aggressive SOF-type activities in a global environment where such activities were the hallmark of true insurgent-terrorist organizations or movements.

The history of the political and cultural tension is centuries long, and came to a point after independence but Major Smith’s discussion of it is much too simplified, possibly because none of his references appear to date prior to 2005. For instance, the British did not import the “Hindu Tamils” into Sri Lanka in the 18th century; they have been resident there for millennia and claim, with some historical justice, to be residents on the island as long as the Sinhalese. The British did import in the 19th century a number of Tamils from India to work on the tea plantations in the central highlands of the country. These Tamils are not seen—by anyone including themselves—as part of the Tamil community out of which arose the LTTE. In fact, they stayed consciously out of the conflict and all through it maintained representation in Parliament. Apart from this Tamil community, a large number of resident Tamils continued to live in the central and southern part of the country, and especially in Colombo where they constitute a significant part of the professional and business community.

It should also be noted that Tamil insurgent groups did not “unite” into the LTTE or Tamil Tigers. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran “united” what remained of the other groups after he had killed their leaders and key cadres in a fairly short but very vicious intra-communal struggle in the Tamil north of the country.

Possibly more significant than these matters is another Clauswitzian concern, the political implications of the government’s victory. Like the legendary Holmesian dog which did not bark, there is a very significant name missing from the article—the commanding general of the Sri Lankan army which conducted the victorious final campaign. Shortly after the victory, Commander of the Army General Sarath Fonseka broke ranks, so to speak, with President Rajapaksa whose increasingly authoritarian behavior had become worrisome to many. General Fonseka decided to oppose Rajapaksa in a national election, was defeated, and for his pains has been charged with treason and placed under detention.

Who deserves the credit for the military victory is not my concern here, nor the rights and wrongs of the political debate between the president and the general. What is of interest and concern to many, and especially to many Sri Lankans, is the apparent effort of the government to use the military victory as the basis for serious encroachments on what had been a very robust democracy, much admired around the world.

—Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks

Keeping the Army "Army Strong"

2010-10-27T13:28:00.001-04:00

GEN George Casey announced yesterday that the Army will conduct a study on how 9 years of war have affected the Service as a profession. GEN Martin Dempsey, commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, will spearhead the effort, in which GEN Casey has given him the latitude to "make recommendations . . . for changes to Army policy and programs that will strengthen us as an institution."

In an interview that appears in the forthcoming issue of PRISM, GEN Dempsey makes clear that the subject of the Army profession has long been a central concern for him. Topics he addresses include what makes the Army a unique profession, why the time is right to focus on a renewal of the professional ethic, and what leaders’ responsibilities are to the profession. Click here to read the interview.

Off the (Electronic) Shelf: John A. Gentry Reviews Keith Shimko’s The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution

2010-10-18T08:55:00.008-04:00

The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution
By Keith L. Shimko
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010
249 pp. $27.99
ISBN: 978–0–521–12884–1

Reviewed by
JOHN A. GENTRY

What are the military lessons of the Iraq wars for the future of U.S. defense policy? Should the Iraq wars be seen as a fundamental turning point in the history of warfare? Keith L. Shimko, professor of political science at Purdue University, addresses these questions through the lens of an American Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) he sees occurring during three Iraq wars—Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the conventional warfare of March–April 2003, and the ongoing insurgency that erupted in August 2003. Shimko’s dissection of the war that began in 2003 is suspect, but it enables him to assert that the American RMA quickly won two “wars” comprised of rapid, violent battles between mismatched conventional military forces.

Shimko explains his conclusion that an American military revolution is ongoing within a lengthy, generally well-balanced intellectual history of the RMA discussion in the United States that is the major contribution of the book. Despite noting many prescient criticisms of the concept, and recognizing that many claims by proponents of RMA and related concepts like transformation and net-centric warfare are exaggerated or fanciful, he largely accepts the latter claims anyway. He also repeatedly attacks Stephen Biddle, one of the best contemporary American political-military analysts of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, who has a less expansive concept of military revolution.

Shimko’s military revolutions are evidenced mainly by tactical advantages in conventional battle provided by technological innovations like precision munitions. They do not, however, have to be used in all conflicts or always even be useful. Hence, the much reduced relevance of RMA-like technologies in the “third” Iraq war in which U.S. forces initially floundered—and the distractive characteristics of the obsessive U.S. focus on finding technological solutions to military challenges—does not diminish Shimko’s confidence in an ongoing American military revolution. We are left with a concept of military revolution that is a light, generalized, and significantly qualified version of more strident air- and network-focused concepts associated with the likes of John Warden, Harlan Ullman, and Arthur Cebrowski.

Shimko’s concept of military revolution is so narrowly conventional, yet fluid and undemanding, that it encompasses most moderately useful military innovations. His broad claims for a continuing American RMA amid accurate descriptions and assessments of troubled U.S. military operations in Somalia, Kosovo, and Iraq since 2003, and recognition that technologically inferior but clever adversaries can defeat even the targeting technologies that are among RMA proponents’ best arguments (pp. 103, 122–123), render his concept largely useless for theoretical, military operational, and policymaking purposes. It can even be dangerous because it presents an appealing vision easily abused by technophiles with parochial interests; exploited by military tourists seeking quick victories in minimally personally risky, short, conventional wars against weak opponents; and used as a lens through which policymakers focus on the narrow range of military activities in which American technology provides clear but transient advantages at the long-term cost of ignoring the full spectrum of military missions that U.S. forces may be ordered to conduct.

Shimko makes some of the common mistakes of RMA proponents. Despite numerous caveats, he sees war as consisting of medium-intensity, conventional fighting—not broad, complex, political/military conflict. He sees in the alleged American RMA a desirable, massive increase in U.S. ability to gather and communicate data but barely discusses the irrelevance of such data without its conversion into sound political/military judgments. He acknowledges that military leaders like H.R. McMaster and David Petraeus learned much of what they needed to know in Iraq by drinking tea with local citizens but ignores the fact that even this kind of information requires contextual knowledge to be operationally useful—something technology cannot provide (p. 208). While recognizing that the U.S. military as an institution long has avoided developing such cultural awareness, he little addresses why or how the deficiency can be overcome.

Shimko also passes on an opportunity to discuss a major, ongoing feature of war that arguably is more revolutionary than the technology he dwells upon—the changes in motives for, political calculations about, and conduct of war driven by massively increased sensitivity to casualties since 1945. He addresses normative aspects of modern war in passing, recognizing that precision munitions can help keep casualties down. But American enemies since North Vietnam nearly half a century ago have repeatedly used tactical military actions to attack casualty-related U.S. strategic political vulnerabilities in ways that defeated the United States while U.S. military forces in the field were unbeaten. These changes have been revolutionary in the broad sense that they alter societies and politics as well as military actions, and they generate surprise strategic outcomes. Gil Merom, Ward Thomas, Alan Kuperman, and others provide some insights into such processes, but much more work remains to be done. Moreover, actual and potential U.S. adversaries, including Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Chinese and Iranian military theorists see in America’s peculiarly gizmo-centric variety of warfare opportunities to exploit U.S. casualty sensitivity and technological vulnerabilities and to convert U.S. material “power” and technological assets into political liabilities by, among other means, using disinformation to mislead Americans into generating collateral damage incidents.

In the end, Shimko does not persuasively offer evidence or logic that the Iraq wars offer major RMA-related lessons or mark a turning point in military history. He does not convincingly demonstrate that a U.S. military revolution exists. Lessons of recent wars surely abound, but they, and Shimko’s modest discussions of them, mainly reflect military cultural and U.S. Government-wide institutional factors whose excessive focus on RMA obscures more than it clarifies.

LTC John A. Gentry (USAR, Ret.) received a Ph.D. in political science from George Washington University and writes on military and intelligence topics.

Off the (Electronic) Shelf: A Review by Crispin Burke

2010-09-23T14:56:00.007-04:00

Followers of the many discussions about counterinsurgency being bandied about the blogosphere should be familiar with the name of today’s contributor. As the keeper of the influential blog Wings Over Iraq and a contributor to Small Wars Journal and many other blogs, Captain Crispin Burke, USA, is in the vanguard of rising young warrior-scholars who are translating their mastery of the classic counterinsurgency canon into the dynamic contemporary milieu of online discussion and debate about the subject. For our purposes today, though, the good old-fashioned book review is CPT Burke’s weapon of choice—but maybe he read the book on one of those new-fangled electronic devices. . . . . In any event, let us know if his assessment whets your appetite to delve into the book for yourself.

—L.M. Yambrick

Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges
Edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney
New York: Routledge, 2010
280 pp. $145.00
ISBN: 978–0–415–77764–3

Reviewed by
CRISPIN BURKE

Compiling a collection of essays on a subject as complex, diverse, and ever-evolving as counterinsurgency is certainly no easy feat. Yet Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney have managed to glean salient, albeit often contradictory, discussions from some of the best minds in the business in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges.

As suggested by the subtitle, Understanding Counterinsurgency is divided into three sections. The first examines the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Next is an in-depth discussion of the operational aspects of counterinsurgency, featuring essays by experts and practitioners from each branch of the U.S. military. The final, and most important, section surveys the myriad challenges within the counterinsurgency environment, with essays focusing on the impact of governance and information operations, to the omnipresent influence of time.

Part I, Doctrinal Origins, which features essays from the four major powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), traces the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and places it in historical context. American audiences should take note of chapters concerning the British and French armies, given the influence of writers such as David Galula and Charles Calwell on Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency.

Curiously, as contributor Etienne de Durand notes, David Galula—referenced in near-reverent tones by almost half the authors in the book—is but a minor figure in the development of French counterinsurgency doctrine. According to Durand, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Joseph-Simon Gallieni, and Hubert Lyautey are true masters of the subject. Alas, much of their work is overshadowed by Galula’s, due to the fact that only Galula published his works in English.

However, counterinsurgency is not a phenomenon exclusive to NATO. Accounts of recent counterinsurgency campaigns in Rhodesia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or David Kilcullen’s harrowing experiences in Indonesia might also have served as excellent topics. Yet Rid and Keaney can certainly be forgiven for excluding studies of these conflicts. Insurgencies have existed since ancient times, so a narrowing of the field is certainly understandable.

In Part II, Operational Aspects, military officers such as Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, USA (Ret.), Major General Charles Dunlap, USAF, and Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA (Ret.) provide Service-specific views on counterinsurgency. With the disparate missions and goals of each of these Services, it is natural to see disagreement on some of the finer details. Such disagreement bears examination and further study. For example, Dunlap stresses in his chapter that the U.S. military must abandon its manpower-intensive approach to counterinsurgency, advocating a lighter footprint through the use of airpower. Such a claim, of course, differs from views expressed by Army and Marine authors Peter Mansoor and Frank Hoffman, as well as by British Army colonel Alexander Alderson, who briefly touches upon the British experience with “air policing” during the interwar period. Some may feel that conflicting viewpoints detract from the value of a primer on counterinsurgency. Yet debate is healthy and, in a changing environment, absolutely necessary.

Part III, Challenges, includes the most complex and diverse group of essays on some of the obvious aspects of counterinsurgency—governance, culture, and information operations—as well as more abstract concepts, such as the effects of time, as well as ethics. Featuring essays from Andrew Exum, Sarah Sewall, Nadia Schadlow, and others, the all-important “soft” side of counterinsurgency is well represented. Of particular note is Nadia Schadlow’s chapter on governance, ultimately the path to an exit strategy in any counterinsurgency campaign. Yet in my mind, the most clever and unexpected chapter is Austin Long’s essay on the impact of time, both at the micro, tactical level, as well as in the macro, strategic realm. Indeed, anyone who’s ever taken part in “eating soup with a knife” can relate to Long’s description of the paradox of time—counterinsurgents must exercise patience, yet they must realize that they are always racing against the clock of public support.

It was in Part II that I happened upon my one—and only—annoyance with Understanding Counterinsurgency. The farther one probes into the book—assuming one reads the book from front to back—the more one uncovers a handful of oft-repeated anecdotes and references. Frequent allusions to David Galula and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program from the Vietnam War spring to mind. By the time I reached Ms. Schadlow’s excellent essay on governance, I screamed at what must have been the third or fourth reference to the “important thinker in the school of classical counterinsurgency, David Galula.” Admittedly, though, the repetition is little more than a minor nuisance.

However, the most important chapter is the conclusion from Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney themselves. Counterinsurgency doctrine has come under considerable fire in recent months. As such, Rid and Keaney place the doctrine within its appropriate strategic context. Counterinsurgency is a useful tool. As several historical vignettes demonstrate, counterinsurgency campaigns are frequently thrust upon great powers, often occurring in the wake of larger, more conventional campaigns.

Nevertheless, counterinsurgency doctrine should be understood in the greater strategic picture. As Rid and Keaney ominously conclude:

Understanding counterinsurgency also means understanding the emotional side and its ensuing risk: the higher the costs and the longer it takes, the higher the likelihood that war . . . may change “from a tool of policy to a force that imposes—or seeks to impose—its own emotional demands.” These emotional demands make it both more difficult and more important to remember that wars are fought not to be won, but to gain a political objective beyond war.

Captain Crispin Burke, a UH–60 helicopter pilot, is currently an observer/controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He has had assignments in the 82^d Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force–Bravo in Honduras, and the 10^th Mountain Division in Iraq. He writes for Small Wars Journal, and for his own blog, Wings Over Iraq, under the name “Starbuck.”

The New Dawn Drawdown

2010-08-13T15:33:00.000-04:00

In a departure ceremony earlier this week, the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team—the last U.S. combat brigade in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom—symbolically ended the U.S. combat mission and turned responsibility for the country’s security over to the Iraqi Security Forces. The 50,000 troops who will remain in country as members of Advise and Assist Brigades under the transitional mission Operation New Dawn will require only 1.2 million pieces of the 3.4 million pieces of equipment that were in Iraq as of January 2009.

One of three fates awaits the excess equipment: movement to Afghanistan to support U.S. troops, return to the United States to replenish inventory, or turnover to the Iraqi Security Forces. A movement of this magnitude has not been accomplished since World War II, when an entire U.S. Army corps was redirected to face German forces at the Battle of the Bulge. The enormous transfer has been dubbed “Nickel II” in honor of the code name given to GEN George Patton’s astonishing accomplishment in 1944.

In “Responsible Drawdown: Synchronizing the Joint Vision,” Paul C. Hurley and John J. Abbatiello laud the logistical competence in support of operations that generally is enabled by Joint Publication (JP) 4–0, Joint Logistics. However, they contend that JP 4–0 offers scant guidance for Nickel II–type situations: the partial redeployment of forces and equipment “in the midst of an extremely fluid political and security environment.” Hurley and Abbatiello explain how Army I Corps, upon assuming duties as Multi-National Corps–Iraq, transcended that shortfall by moving beyond JP 4–0’s contention that the operational level of warfare is where “the essence of joint logistics resides.” Find out more by clicking here to read the article, which will appear in the October issue of Joint Force Quarterly.

Colombia as a Counterinsurgency Classroom

2010-08-02T10:30:00.000-04:00

Retired Army Colonel Robert Killebrew, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and Bogota bureau chief for The Best Defense blog, contends that in the ongoing quest for news of counterinsurgency successes, Colombia has been overlooked. President Alvaro Uribe has taken a hard-line approach against the FARC and implemented a three-step whole-of-government process in the effort: the military removes the FARC from its strongholds across the country, the National Police and courts fill the vacuum, and the government offers economic assistance and provides infrastructure for the newly secure and stable population.

Thomas A. Marks, Chair of the Irregular Warfare Department at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs, also believes there is much to be learned from Colombia’s experience. In “Colombia: Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response,” Marks writes of the centrality of the country’s “learning institutions” in the achievement of the upper hand over the FARC. For Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy to succeed, Colombia’s state institutions in general and security forces in particular needed to adapt and function in unaccustomed ways: “The national narrative . . . was that the state and its security forces were at one with the population in resisting those who would oppress them.” Marks offers a detailed account of the domino-effect adaptation that occurred, from the administration’s crafting of a genuine counterinsurgency plan to the state security forces’ operationalization of that plan (including the standing up of local forces and police) to the blossoming of the democratic process and its associated benefits in the new environment.

Dr. Marks’s article will appear in PRISM 1, no. 4 (September 2010), but you can read it here now:

Colombia: Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response

Off the (Electronic) Shelf

2010-07-27T09:01:00.002-04:00

In this book review written for Joint Force Quarterly, Kirby Dennis’s perspective of Mark Moyar’s A Question of Command veers 180 degrees from a critique of the book recently posted at Small Wars Journal. If you’ve read the book, tell us whose opinion you share and why.

A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
By Mark Moyar
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009
301 pp., $19.80
Reviewed by Kirby R. Dennis

Among the long list of military historians who have examined the art and science of battlefield leadership, few can match the accomplishments of John Keegan. Perhaps best known for his classic The Face of Battle (Penguin, 1983), Keegan’s analysis has proven relevant over decades of evolving conflict and remains instructive to this day. In a follow-up to Face, Keegan produced an equally important analysis of generalship in times of conflict. In The Mask of Command (Viking, 1987), Keegan examines the evolving nature of wartime leadership and posits that a confluence of factors—among them, societal norms and technology—influences the nature of command and ultimately affects the manner in which leaders make decisions. Now, over two decades later, Mark Moyar offers A Question of Command, a counterargument to Keegan’s analysis of counterinsurgency warfare. Moyar extracts 10 attributes of effective counterinsurgency leadership from a historical analysis of 150 years of conflict, and in doing so, applies what Keegan refers to as the traits method of analysis—a notion that universally applied, common characteristics can determine success or failure on the front lines of battle.

The premise behind Moyar’s analysis is that counterinsurgency is, above all else, leader-centric warfare. Moyar specifies the attributes of effective leadership—initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization—which he highlights in accounts of nine counterinsurgency campaigns. His analysis covers the full spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict throughout history, giving equal attention to the intensively studied modern campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and to the lesser known conflicts of post–Civil War Reconstruction, the Philippine Insurrection of 1899, and the Salvadoran insurgency in the early 1980s. Moyar concludes the book with a chapter entitled “How to Win,” in which he seeks to provide a roadmap for the military to use in its recruitment and development of future leaders.

While noble in its efforts and interesting in content, the book has limited success in achieving its purpose. Moyar states at the outset that his analysis aims to assist counterinsurgents in the execution of their mission, but that overall purpose is lost in the intervening pages where he delves into the historical minutiae of each counterinsurgency campaign. Broadly speaking, history is central to any effective analysis of battlefield command, and Moyar acknowledges such in his sweeping account of counterinsurgency warfare. However, this book offers much more history than analysis, which ultimately mutes the book’s bottom line and leaves the reader grasping for clear examples of Moyar’s 10 attributes in practice. His descriptions of 18 Civil War officers and their experiences in combat, detailed accounting of the background of Filipino political personalities and movements in the 1950s, and rehashing of the all-too-familiar history of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq lend credence to the idea that less can often be more.

In addition, Moyar claims a level of exclusivity for his idea of leader-centric warfare and ultimately takes the “gospel” of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to task. Specifically, Moyar writes that Field Manual (FM) 3–24 makes no mention of “empowering quality American or host-nation commanders,” and therefore neglects to address a central tenet of counterinsurgency warfare. While Moyar may be technically correct in his assertion, it is a stretch to intimate that U.S. Army doctrine does not advocate empowerment at all levels of command. To be sure, FM 3–24 clearly endorses the concept of decentralization in its opening chapter under the principle “Empower the Lowest Levels.” More to the point, in the 3 years between the publications of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual and of Moyar’s book, it has become abundantly clear that empowering American and host-nation leaders in the execution of COIN operations is a cornerstone of not only the Nation’s strategy, but also the military’s education and training programs. To his credit, Moyar calls to mind the importance of sound leadership at all levels of command, and in doing so reinforces a bedrock tenet of warfare for the contemporary student. However, this book could be more fittingly described as a history of counterinsurgency conflict rather than the playbook that the author intends it to be. After all, using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to select counterinsurgency leaders does not exactly fit a timely purpose—which, in Moyar’s own words, is “to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq . . . [and] in Afghanistan.”

If there is one widely acknowledged lesson to emerge from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that counterinsurgency warfare is, to say the least, difficult. It is an exercise in physical and mental willpower for the leader on the ground, who is required to motivate, think, plan, articulate, learn, and adapt at a constant pace. However, the ability of a leader to do all of these things is often not enough. David Kilcullen states as much in his most recent book Counterinsurgency (Oxford, 2010), where he unearths two historical trends that have often made the difference between victory and defeat. Kilcullen found overwhelming evidence to indicate that, first, fighting in one’s own country provides a marked advantage, and second, success in counterinsurgency often depends on a willingness to negotiate with the enemy. Kilcullen’s argument is instructive in that it softens Moyar’s claim that effective leadership is the most important aspect to defeating an insurgency. To be sure, achieving tactical, operational, and strategic goals in a counterinsurgency campaign requires a host of factors to work in harmony; among them are effective police forces, a viable host-nation government, and, indeed, competent military leaders on the front lines. In the end, A Question of Command is a thoughtful analysis from which we all can learn, but Moyar’s notion of leader-centric doctrine addresses only part of the solution to an enormously complex problem, and, therefore, is not the panacea that he claims it to be.

Major Kirby R. Dennis, USA, is an infantry officer with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

START Me Up

2010-07-22T08:50:00.005-04:00

Today’s guest blogger is Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University–Brandywine and frequent contributor to Joint Force Quarterly (http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/cimbala.pdf) (http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/8.pdf) (https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/ndupress,20659). Recent discourse on the pros and cons of ratifying New START has prompted Dr. Cimbala to share some salient observations about the roles that politics, geostrategic interests, and military realities play in the ratification process in particular and in the formation of deterrence concepts in general on both sides of the ocean.

Mitt Romney’s recent broadside against the New START agreement, with rejoinders by Fred Kaplan and Senator John Kerry, among others, reminds us that the ratification of New START and follow-on progress in nuclear arms reductions are more predictably accomplished in Moscow than in Washington, DC. New START comes up for Senate approval in the midst of a congressional campaign that is already overheated by partisan wrangling over responsibility for climate change and oil spills, for unprecedented deficits, for the conduct of two major wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and most of all, for stagnation in the American economy. New START could fall victim to the toxicity of the political climate regardless of its contents with respect to limitations on nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

Domestic politics matter in Russia, too, with respect to New START ratification, but the Kremlin commands the necessary parliamentary majorities to pass the agreement through the relevant committees and the Russian Duma. Nevertheless, twitchy Russian military conservatives, skeptical publicists with tacit Kremlin backing, and other New START opponents have signaled that later rounds of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms limitation will not go as easily as did the first Obama-Medvedev agreement. And with respect to Russian geostrategic perspectives, there are a number of important issues related to nuclear arms reductions in the background of current and future discussions, including U.S. missile defenses, NATO enlargement, and Russian military reform.

The Obama administration rebooted the George W. Bush plan for the European-based component of the U.S. global missile defense program. The Obama ballistic missile defense plan emphasizes a phased, adaptive deployment of theater missile defenses keyed on regional threats against European or other allied targets. The immediate concern on the part of U.S. and allied military planners is their assumption that Iran is bent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability or, short of that, developing the technology to become a virtual nuclear weapons state (that is, maintaining a civil nuclear infrastructure and sufficient quantities of weapons-grade material to support a prompt decision for weaponization). Russia has ambivalent objectives on this issue: Moscow prefers that Iran not develop or deploy nuclear weapons, but Russia is more reluctant than are the United States and other “P–5 plus one” countries to impose stronger sanctions against Tehran. Russia also has strong economic ties to Iran (as does China), and neither Moscow nor Beijing would vote for the use of military force to dissuade Iran from joining the ranks of nuclear weapons states.

U.S. European-based missile defenses are regarded as ambiguous political expressions and potential military threats to Russia, in part because they overlap with NATO enlargement and Russian military reform. Russia asserts priority interests and a diplomatic droit de regard over security decisions in former Soviet space, but Russia’s conventional military forces are inferior to those of NATO. Russia is embarked upon serious military reform, intended to transform its armed forces from a World War II–style military based on mass conscription and trained for decisive shock battle on the plains of Europe. Instead, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” political leadership, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of the General Staff recognize that 21st-century Russia needs a modern military that is light, mobile, based on voluntary enlistment more than conscription, and capable of conducting network-centric warfare against conventional and unconventional military opponents. This military transformation will take considerable time and, meanwhile, Russia’s nuclear forces will be relied upon for deterrence and dissuasion missions other than those that are strictly nuclear.

The Obama administration, like its predecessor, has sought to find common ground with Russia where possible while not giving away its basic or extended deterrence commitments. With regard to the military balance as between Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, this implies that the two states can negotiate bilateral reductions in weapons deployed on intercontinental launchers without placing into jeopardy deterrence or crisis stability for either side. Some Russian and even some American analysts have warned that if Russia’s nuclear modernization fails, the United States will end up with a potential nuclear first strike capability relative to Russia’s weaker strategic nuclear “triad” of land- and sea-based intercontinental missiles and heavy bombers. In this instance, analysts may find that their statistical calculations lead to scientific impasses and briefings that dead-end in political incredulity. The truth is that the survival of a U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race beyond the Cold War and the Soviet Union has as much to do with bureaucratic inertia, atavistic habits of strategic thinking, and political opportunism as it does with geostrategic logic. To this argument, about the political absurdity of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, pessimists respond that Russia might be coerced diplomatically by a superior U.S. strategic nuclear force, even if no weapons were actually fired in anger. However, as noted above, neither the United States nor NATO requires nuclear weapons for the coercion of Russia, if need be (as seen from the Russian perspective, which is what deterrence is all about).

The New START and possible follow-on agreements for strategic nuclear arms reductions might also expedite the building of stronger international consensus in favor of tough sanctions and other measures to support nuclear nonproliferation. The signature cases of Iran and North Korea are tipping points for the nonproliferation regime built around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international agreements. North Korea has a diplomatic style that only Martin Scorsese or Quentin Tarantino could comprehend. The recent (July 2010) visit to the Korean demilitarized zone by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, announcing additional sanctions against North Korea for its recalcitrance, was both a warning and an opportunity for North Korea to resume six-party talks on denuclearization. Success may await the departure of Kim Jong-Il as head of state or the defenestration of his regime, and even then, denuclearization of North Korea may require a broader agreement that also officially terminates the Korean War and agrees to treat North Korea as a normal state.

Iran’s diplomatic strategy is more traditional than that of North Korea: alternating promissory notes of cooperation with assertions of sovereign rights to develop civil nuclear power for peaceful purposes, while playing shell games with UN inspectors and employing chest-pounding diplomacy as a backdrop for Tehran’s rise to regional preeminence. Even short of nuclear weapons, Iran has the potential to create internal political problems for American interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. A nuclear weapons capability for Iran would not necessarily imply a willingness to engage in a nuclear first strike against regional enemies or others, or even to make explicit threats to do so. Mere possession of a small number of nuclear weapons provides Iran with a potential deterrent against military intervention in the region, against Iran’s interest, by outsiders—including the United States. In short, nukes even in small numbers could give Iran an anti-access, area denial deterrent. Under this umbrella of protection, Iran could then support hellraising allied militias and other unconventional formations in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, delaying the military departure of U.S. and allied NATO forces from the region.

An Iranian nuclear weapons capability could be followed by Saudi, Egyptian, or other Middle Eastern nuclear weapons states, boiling over the pot of nonproliferation constraints and creating an unstable potlatch of nuclear forces whose survivability was uncertain. Russia and the United States may not have identical interests here, but they do have overlapping interests in preventing a Middle Eastern replay of August 1914 within a heady brew of nationalism, religion, and apocalyptic score-settling. Thus, the criticism that U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions do not necessarily, or automatically, create a higher probability of success for nuclear nonproliferation is true but tediously so, and possibly escapist from responsibility. The NPT requires of its nuclear weapons state signatories that they undertake in good faith reductions in their own inventories of nuclear weapons, in addition to keeping them out of the hands of currently non–nuclear weapons states. Beyond legalities, Washington and Moscow acting together can accomplish more than either separately, with regard to the suasion of other nuclear and nonnuclear states, in favor of prudence and transparency.

Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons is unlikely to be realized in his lifetime, as he has acknowledged. On the other hand, governing is about practical choosing, and our choices are not limited to nuclear abolition or nuclear anarchy. Nuclear containment and partial disarmament by disaggregation of the motives and means for nuclear weapons acquisition or, even worse, nuclear first use, is a worthy set of accomplishments. Nuclear containment begins with U.S. and Russian nuclear arms reductions (including eventually the thorny problem of nonstrategic nuclear weapons), continues with the drawing of firm lines against additional proliferators, and may proceed into more transparency and accountability as proposed in the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, in ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and in agreed international restrictions on the protection and accountability for fissile materials and nuclear production facilities.

Alas, for nonproliferation optimists, these worthy objectives cannot be accomplished by international diplomacy alone. Behind the aide-mémoire of the negotiator must lie the power of military potential for coercion or, if necessary, use against the state or nonstate enemies of humanity and decency. A very important aspect of nuclear danger in the 21st century, unlike the First Nuclear Age more or less concomitant with the Cold War, is that nuclear weapons politically speaking are no longer “mass” but “niche” forces. As advanced militaries move further into information-based conventional warfare, those left behind will be tempted toward nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as equalizers and system disturbers. Although both Cold War–era American and Soviet leaders eventually agreed that a nuclear war “could never be won, and should never be fought” as President Reagan said, definitions of “winning” are distressingly culture-bound, ideologically fallible, and rooted in domestic psychologies that would defy Freudian analysis. In addition, whether new nuclear weapons states will have militaries and forces that are under the secure and stable command and control of sensible political leaders (sensible meaning, in this context, deriving political objectives from international system realities, as opposed to domestic political fantasies) remains to be seen.

Prestigious academics and others contend that a world with additional nuclear weapons states is not necessarily more unstable than one with fewer: it depends on “who” acquires the weapons and what they intend to do with them. The addresses of states that deploy nuclear forces certainly do matter, as do their strategic cultures and histories. Arms control is not sui generis: it is as flawed or successful as the policy and strategy that it supports. The Obama national security strategy, like the George W. Bush strategy that preceded it, is pessimistic about the likelihood that further spread of nuclear weapons, especially among rogue state or nonstate actors, can advance the causes of peace and security. This consensus among political and military experts goes back even further, as Cold War history shows. Theorists can contemplate the spread of nuclear weapons with equanimity, on the assumption that deterrence having survived the Cold War will last out another century or so. However, deterrence is a problematical construct, culturally dependent and motivationally based on “the threat that leaves something to chance,” as Thomas Schelling explained it. In other words, nuclear deterrence is the military equivalent of a hedge fund or a derivative: it can appear to have worked infallibly until the very moment that it fails spectacularly. A small nuclear war, as Professor Colin Gray has noted, is a contradiction in terms—not only in military terms, but also in the psychological and political impacts of the first nuclear weapon fired in anger since Nagasaki.

——Stephen J. Cimbala

More on MISO

2010-07-20T07:57:00.002-04:00

Today’s guest blogger is Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, interim director of the Center for Strategic Research in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. Dr. Lamb, who knows a little something about special operations and PSYOP (https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPTR=14166) (http://www.cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-13190-2/), adds to the discussion about the PSYOP-to-MISO name change shell game.

Confused Chickens Come Home to Roost

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recently announced that the term psychological operations (PSYOP) is being replaced with the term military support to information operations (MISO). Stephen Walt writes amusingly in his July 7 blog for Foreign Policy that this is a classic George Carlin moment of euphemism trumping clarity. Yes, it is, but it also reflects a decade-long lobbying effort from some PSYOP practitioners who are confused about the purpose of their own operations.

In 2003, after prolonged internal debate and review, the Pentagon approved the Information Operations Roadmap that focused PSYOP on “support to military endeavors in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments (i.e. when adversaries are part of the equation).” Many PSYOP professionals refused to accept these constraints designed to draw a clear distinction between PSYOP and public diplomacy (PD) and public affairs (PA). They argued PSYOP could be benign and employed for a wide range of information purposes and that it could include friendly forces and populations.

In April, 2005, I was asked by senior PSYOP leaders in the Pentagon to comment on a proposal to change the name of PSYOP to something “more benign.” These officials argued “PSYOP carries negative connotations that have persisted since World War II despite successful and honorable DOD PSYOP employments in numerous peacetime and conflict environments for the past 70 years. Until the term PSYOP is changed, the problem of image will persist.” In other words, they thought the problem was one of image rather than substance. Here are excerpts from my response that attempts to clarify the real issue:

My major comment is that I would have to disagree with the underlying premise in the paper, which is the argument that the real problem is misperceptions about the nature of PSYOP that can be corrected with name changes. . . . In my view PSYOP is a real, substantive discipline that can be and should be distinguished from PA and PD. It is not just "all true information" from different USG [U.S. Government] sources. This is the key issue, one that the paper glosses over. Let me try to make my case to you that PSYOP is substantively different from PA and PD.

PSYOP is distinguished from PA and PD by its purpose and its TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures]. The purpose of PSYOP is to support military operations, not promote American foreign policy. It does the latter in support of the former, but the rock bottom reason we have military personnel conducting PSYOP is that other military personnel need their help, not because disseminating PA and PD in some environments is too dangerous and only military personnel are willing or asked to take those risks.

This is no minor issue. Military operations are conducted primarily and ultimately to defeat enemies of the United States. This means that in most, if not all situations, the purpose of PSYOP is to make military operations more effective, not look out for the interests of other parties. Again, PSYOP may help others besides the U.S. military, but this is incidental to their real purpose. If you look at the professional literature on persuasive communications, most of the "ethics" discussion comes down to a question of whether you have the target audience's best interests at heart. PSYOP may provide information that is helpful to a target audience, but fundamentally it exists to further the interests of our military personnel and their endeavors, not those of the target audience. This is why PSYOP is ethically suspect in PA and PD circles. Both these disciplines can make a stronger claim to speaking in the interests of the audience; PD less than PA, but both much more so than PSYOP. It is this real, substantive fact that makes PSYOP a problem for PA and PD, not just the label. In short, the enduring image problem PSYOP has with PA and PD is related to its true nature, not just the edgy, manipulative implication of the PSYOP label itself. (In fact, if you will forgive my saying so, I think we must keep the PSYOP name in the perhaps forlorn, even desperate hope that we can remind PSYOP personnel of their true calling!)

Concerning PSYOP TTPs, on the emotion-reason continuum PSYOP will be found to use more emotion, and on occasion deception, than PD or PA can tolerate. There is no way to hide this fact. It is possible to get around the minor deception problem by insisting that when PSYOP deceives, it is doing deception, not PSYOP. This is the same argument the IO Roadmap makes for PSYOP doing PD, by the way. It is still a bit disingenuous. Some PSYOP messages by their very nature lead the target audiences to untrue conclusions or conclusions that are not wholly true, and many would see a small element of deception (as in misrepresentation) in those tactics just as you would in much Madison Avenue advertising. Obviously PSYOP avoids blatant untruths that would be counterproductive and undermine PSYOP credibility with the target audience. . . . Again, changing the name to fool the other USG persuasive communication disciplines will not work. As for the MIST [military information support team], it works not because the name is changed (although that helps), but because it is a free resource to help the embassy do PA and PD tasks for which it is not properly staffed. The price PSYOP pays for giving the free resource away is not just less PSYOP talent focused on PSYOP, but confusion in the ranks of PSYOP about what PSYOP really is.

If PSYOP is substantively different than PA and PD in ways that require distinctions to be made between these disciplines, a name change will not solve the problem we have. In fact, it will make the problem worse. You won't fool the PA and PD guys. They may take free PSYOP resources if sufficiently disguised, but they will remain convinced that PSYOP neither understands nor intends to stay true to its purpose (or in its lane). As a result, we will get less of the very important coordination that we need.

In short, this issue has been long debated, and apparently those within the PSYOP community who wanted the name change have finally prevailed. It is unfortunate on several levels, but that would be the subject of a longer blog. Here, I just wanted to clarify the real issue that is behind the name change and share the lament of PSYOP icons like Alfred Paddock, Jr., who argued against the change in Joint Force Quarterly and in Small Wars Journal. As NDU Press blogger Lisa Yambrick noted, “For Paddock and many others, MISO is likely to be a no-go.” Ditto on the no go on MISO!

Chris Lamb

PSYOP Name Change Could Cause MISOry

2010-06-24T16:20:00.005-04:00

Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly has approved a recommendation by the Defense Senior Leaders Conference (comprised of the Combatant Commanders, Service chiefs, and civilian Pentagon leaders) to replace the term psychological operations (PSYOP) with military information support and/to operations (MISO). The relabeling issue, which has been rearing its linguistic head for years, is an emotionally charged subject for many PSYOP practitioners; a commenter on the Small Wars Journal blog bemoans the loss of the “intimidation factor” that the term PSYOP itself carries, not to mention the loss of the identity of his branch.

In “Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations” (JFQ 56, 1^st quarter 2010), Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., makes the Army argument against any kind of name change, which had not yet occurred when the article was published. He traces the Service’s use of terminology since World War I to describe the “employment of persuasive communication,” points out the practical difficulties the change would place on doctrine writers, and asserts that using euphemisms for a term that some find distasteful only draws more attention to the purpose of the activities conducted under the term’s guise. For Paddock and many others, MISO is likely to be a no-go.

Helping Military Docs Spot Brain Injuries

2010-06-10T13:33:00.004-04:00

Recent media reports have suggested that many Soldiers with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) are going undiagnosed, in part at least due to inadequate screening tools and procedures in current use.

In the forthcoming NDU Press book The 71F Advantage: Applying Research Psychology to Improve Military Health, Performance, and Policy (ed. Paul T. Bartone, Ross H. Pastel, and Mark A. Vaitkus), Army Research Psychologist Dr. Michael Dretsch contributes a chapter with an up-to-date summary of how blasts and blows can damage brain tissue in Soldiers and how a variety of new brain imaging technologies are being applied to better detect these injuries. CPT Dretsch is a full-time experimental neuropsychologist at the Army’s Aeromedical Research Laboratory who holds a PhD in experimental psychology from the University of Hull, England, and has completed a postdoctoral fellowship at University of Wisconsin in cognitve neuroscience. Hiring expert research psychologists like Dr. Dretsch is part of the Army’s long-term strategy to improve basic knowledge and technologies for preventing and treating TBI, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and other mental health consequences of war. You can read CPT Dretsch’s chapter here; click here to be notified when the book is published.

——P.T. Bartone

A Suggestion for Solving a Navy Problem (Courtesy of the Army)

2010-06-02T14:03:00.006-04:00

The Navy finds itself in a familiar situation these days: trying to maintain U.S. naval supremacy with a fleet that is shrinking, in part because of a tighter budget and growing costs, but also because of technological innovations that render large and expensive ships obsolete before their time. New ways must be found to bridge the gap between the strategies the Navy is asked to support to maintain U.S. domination and the resources it can call upon to fulfill that task. Today’s Strategy Page states that DOD leaders have called for a “reexamination of how naval domination is used, possible alternative approaches, and new ideas in general” that could help to close that gap. LTC Thomas Shrader, USA, believes there is a solution lurking just below the surface, and he argues for it in the forthcoming issue (July 2010) of Joint Force Quarterly.

Click here to view the article.

And the Winners Are...

2010-06-01T11:38:00.003-04:00

NDU Press is pleased to announce the first-place winners of the 4th Annual Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and the 29th Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competitions, held May 18–19, 2010.

Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition:

Col John Frewen, Australian Army, took home the prize for his paper “Harmonious Ocean? Chinese Aircraft Carriers and Australia’s U.S. Alliance,” written while he was a student at the U.S. Army War College.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Research Paper Competition:

LtCol Mark Schrecker, USMC, captured first place with “United States Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions Will Lead to Ultimate Failure,” written for coursework at the National War College.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Article Competition:

LtCol Hans F. Palaoro, USAF, took top honors with “Information Strategy: The Missing Link,” written while he was attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

These winning essays will be published in a forthcoming issue of Joint Force Quarterly. The authors will receive an Amazon.com gift certificate courtesy of the NDU Foundation and will have the opportunity to meet the Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Congratulations to all winners, and thanks to all participants and judges.

Heads or Tails? The COIN Keeps Flipping

2010-05-28T10:19:00.004-04:00

In his keynote address at an irregular warfare conference this week, ADM Eric Olson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, silenced the audience with his comments that counterinsurgency doctrine was “an oxymoron” and that “counterinsurgency should involve countering the insurgents” rather than “protecting populations.” This is some tough talk coming on the heels of Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s decision that the entire military should adopt the counterinsurgency training and proficiency standards implemented by GEN Stanley McChrystal in his “AfPak Hands” program in Afghanistan. And in an interview, Ben Rhodes, the primary author of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) released yesterday, responded affirmatively to the interviewer’s observation of some similarities between the NSS and Army Field Manual 3–24 (FM 3–24), Counterinsurgency, “from the focus of legitimacy of action . . . and in its recognition that too much hard power can be counterproductive.”

Regular readers of JFQ or any milblog are familiar with (and probably participating in) the ongoing battle over all things counterinsurgency. JFQ is doing its part to stoke the fires in the July 2010 issue by including not one but two sets of point/counterpoint articles on FM 3–24 by Gian Gentile and John Nagl, who see counterinsurgency differently, to put it mildly.

Click here to get a preview and to whet your appetite for more.

Students Compete in Annual Essay Competitions

2010-05-20T14:40:00.008-04:00

The 4th Annual Secretary of Defense and 29th Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions took place this week. Students at the joint professional military education colleges, schools, and other educational programs competed for a chance to catch the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. James A. Mowbray of the Air War College stresses the importance of the competitions, stating that “writing is an important part of officer training. It is important to encourage officers to write well so that they can express themselves well.”

Dr. Mowbray, who has been a judge in the essay competition for over 23 years, says the competition is fun and extremely educational. He “likes seeing what the other colleges do” and explains that “it is a great honor to have someone from your own college win the competition.” Mowbray laughs as he remembers one Air War College student, a Naval officer, who had originally been enrolled in the college’s writing program because his writing was so poor. But the student had the last laugh: his end product was a phenomenal research paper that won the competition in the early 1990s. Mowbray believes that the competition has always been startlingly objective: “The judges have a genuine heartfelt desire to send forward only the best.”

This passion for excellence in strategic studies is echoed by fellow judge Professor Charles C. Chadbourn III of the Naval War College. Professor Chadbourn is the longest standing judge in the competition; he has been participating since its inception in 1982. Chadbourn, a Professor of Strategy, says the essay competition gives him a unique opportunity to reconnect with the judges, many of whom come back year after year. He loves reading the papers and seeing the ideas that are generated. One of the best papers he ever read was an essay by Charles L. Dunlap, Jr., called The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, about a fictional overthrow of the government. The essay suggested that the blurring of the military role of the armed forces into civilian missions might be dangerous to democracy and civilian government.

Chadbourn chuckles as he remembers how a movie studio tried to buy the rights to the Dunlap essay. Dr. Frederick T. Kiley, then Director of NDU Press, told the studio that the essay was not for sale. After Kiley refused a very enticing offer, the studio explained that money was not an issue; the studio could afford to pay whatever he wished. Dr. Kiley then explained why he could not take their money: because the essay was written by a military officer for a government-sponsored contest, it was public property and the rights were free to the public. Chadbourn isn’t sure if a movie was ever made after the request.

The seasoned essay judge explains how the papers submitted for the essay competition really run the gamut, covering almost any issue the military has ever faced. When students ask him what they should write about, he counters with, “If you had five minutes to speak with the Chairman, what would you say? That’s what you should write about.” Chadbourn fondly remembers meeting Chairman Colin Powell when a student from the Naval War College won the essay competition. Part of the prize was a meeting with the Chairman. Chadbourn accompanied the student to the meeting and remembers being struck by Powell’s penetrating comments. Powell had done his homework and obviously read the paper, which both surprised and delighted the Professor.

The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions wrapped up yesterday afternoon and the votes were tallied. Final results will be posted by NDU Press after the winners are notified by their schools.

Click here to see photos from the event.

Bio-inspired Innovation and National Security

2010-05-19T07:48:00.004-04:00

New from NDU Press for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy: Bio-inspired Innovation and National Security, edited by Robert E. Armstrong, Mark D. Drapeau, Cheryl A. Loeb, and James J. Valdes.

Despite the vital importance of the emerging area of biotechnology and its role in defense planning and policymaking, no definitive book has been written on the topic for the defense policymaker, the military student, and the private-sector bioscientist interested in the “emerging opportunities market” of national security. This edited volume is intended to help close this gap and provide the necessary backdrop for thinking strategically about biology in defense planning and policymaking.

This volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called “biologically inspired innovations,” to the military. Rather than treating biology as a series of threats to be dealt with, such innovations generally approach the biological sciences as a set of opportunities for the military to gain strategic advantage over adversaries. These opportunities range from looking at everything from genes to brains, from enhancing human performance to creating renewable energy, from sensing the environment around us to harnessing its power.

I’ll Take “Jointness” for $500, Alex

2010-05-17T14:32:00.003-04:00

Professors from all joint professional military education institutions will converge on Fort McNair tomorrow to begin the final round of judging in the 4th Annual Secretary of Defense and 29th Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions. This year’s contests drew a record number of submissions—76—from both U.S. and foreign military and civilian students, all with their eyes on the prize of having their work published in Joint Force Quarterly, potentially meeting the Secretary of Defense or Chairman in person, and appearing on one of America’s favorite game shows.

Uh, wait a minute—that last thing isn’t part of the prize. But that didn’t stop 2004 CJCS Essay Competition winner Col David Belote, USAF, from making it happen. Then LtCol Belote tied for first place with his paper, “The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders,” which he wrote while attending the National War College. Sharing the first-place prize may not have been a lifelong dream for Col Belote, but appearing on the game show Jeopardy! was. After numerous attempts to get on the show, Col Belote, now 99th Air Base Wing Commander at Nellis Air Force Base, appeared on the program in December 2009 and racked up a six-show winning streak.

Whether Col Belote’s triumph in the CJCS Essay Competition led to his success on Jeopardy! has yet to be proven, but we like to think there is a connection—especially if it encourages even more participation in next year’s competitions.

Another Skelton Panel Moment for Officer Education?

2010-05-06T16:07:00.006-04:00

In its first comprehensive report on the professional military education (PME) system since the panel chaired by Congressmen Ike Skelton released its review of the topic 20 years ago, the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation suggests that the system has both systemic and institutional issues that need to be addressed—in particular, the mixed results of the effort to cultivate strategists. The report notes that joint and Service efforts in this regard are “relatively disassociated from one another” and that PME, while an important factor in shaping strategists, is not the primary means of doing so.

Some of the contributors to the forthcoming Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 58, July 2010) undoubtedly will read the HASC Subcommittee report with great interest. The authors of the four articles in the issue’s Commentary section hold forth on some of the aspects of military education, training, and professionalism referenced in the report. In particular, Scott A. Bethel, Aaron Prupas, Tomislav Z. Ruby, and M.V. Smith take a Service-specific perspective regarding the education of strategists in their article “Developing Air Force Strategists: Change Culture, and Reverse Careerism.” Barry Watts, Bernie Schriever, black swans, and Baron de Jomini all figure into their argument, which you can read here in advance of its publication; then click here to sound off to the authors.

The Role of Leadership in Building Resilience in Troops

2010-05-05T15:06:00.009-04:00

The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program launched by the Army last fall is intended to help Soldiers deal with stress by building their resilience to adversity. The Army has designated Master Resilience Trainers to help Soldiers cope with the stresses of deployment.

Dr. Paul T. Bartone, Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at NDU, and several of his colleagues both inside and outside of the university have devoted much of their research to military psychology, stress, adaptation and resilience, and leadership. In Defense Horizons 69, “To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental Hardiness,” Dr. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong enumerated the main stressors of military operations and highlight how unit leader actions and policies can positively affect the mental hardiness of their troops.

In their forthcoming book, The 71F Advantage: Applying Research Psychology to Improve Military Health, Performance, and Policy, Dr. Bartone, Ross H. Pastel, and Mark A. Vaitkus capitalize on the expertise of numerous Army research psychologists to delve more deeply into the psychology of leadership, Soldier psychological health, challenges faced by military families, and other dimensions. Click here to read Dr. Bartone’s chapter, “New Wine in Old Bottles: Leadership and Personality in the Military Organization,” from The 71F Advantage, which will be available from NDU Press in early summer.

Nuclear Politics in Iran

2010-04-30T10:09:00.004-04:00

In the first of a new series of case studies from the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), three prominent scholars examine the emergence of an Iranian nuclear political strategy and its role in shaping domestic political discourse and international security policy. The new case study series is entitled Middle East Security Perspectives. This case study is edited by Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East in INSS.

Farideh Farhi argues that failed negotiations between the reformist government and European representatives have contributed to the increasingly strident tone that Iranian negotiators took after 2006. Next, Bahman Baktiari explores how Iran’s leaders use Western opposition to validate their quest for international legitimacy and to generate domestic national unity. And Anoushiravan Ehteshami analyzes the troubled presidential election of June 2009 and concludes that the relationship between state and society and between the forces that make up the Iranian power elite will never again be the same.

Click here to read the case study.

Deterring Chinese Cyber Militias with Freedom Militias

2010-04-27T08:15:00.003-04:00

Google recently circumvented censorship of its search services in China by shifting to an unfiltered Hong Kong site after being targeted by cyber attacks from the mainland. Two days after Google’s withdrawal, GoDaddy.com announced it had stopped selling new Web domain names in China, citing dismay with government policies designed to tighten control over Internet use by residents. The search giant and Internet domain registry are now encouraging other companies and the U.S. Government to pressure Beijing about alleged human rights violations.

In a Situation Report on GlobalSecurity.com, Richard B. Andres and Paul McNiel of the National Defense University discuss how the U.S. Government can work to break through the “information curtain.”

Deterring Chinese Cyber Militias with Freedom Militias

Richard B. Andres
Paul McNiel

On February 2nd, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair made cyber security the first item in his Annual Threat Assessment report to the US Senate. Coming on the heels of Chinese cyber attacks on Google, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's subsequent demarche and the Chinese government's strongly worded response, the report signals a growing frustration over America's inability to deter foreign, and particularly China-based, cyber attacks.

China is able to discount US and allied diplomatic pressure because it can hide behind a screen of semi-autonomous cyber militias. Although not officially condoned by China, these patriotic freelance hacking groups engage in cyber operations in support of national goals and often act with the tacit approval and sometimes active coordination of the state. The existence of these groups makes it difficult to prove that attacks originating from China are authorized by the government and consequently provides the regime with plausible deniability.

While cyber militias are used by a number of countries, China has been particularly enthusiastic about embracing this methodology. In 2003 the People's Liberation Army announced that it had created a militia unit to launch hacker attacks against enemy networks. In addition to this, the PRC reportedly offers bounties to hackers who successfully conduct operations against the United States. Over the last decade attacks emanating from China have escalated considerably.
US defenses are insufficient to stop Chinese cyber attacks. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission estimates that Chinese cyber attacks cost the US hundreds of billions of dollars annually. By way of comparison, this is substantially more than the entire Chinese military budget.

What is needed is a threat that is both capable of forcing China to take notice and that it will believe the United States would execute. Such a threat exists. While China's regime does not appear willing to be deterred by conventional diplomatic or legal complaints, it has demonstrated considerable concern about threats to its censorship apparatus.

The most effective way to threaten Chinese censorship would be for US and partner nations to develop their own cyber militias. Rather than stealing intellectual property and disabling public institutions, however, Western militias would aim at finding ways to bypass Chinese firewalls to spread internet freedom.

There are a number of ways to set up anti-censorship militias geared toward bypassing firewalls and, equally importantly, protecting Chinese citizens from discovery and retribution for what they read and write online. Groups such as the Tor Anonymity Network and the Global Internet Freedom Consortium that disseminate anonymizing software and set up deflection sites (URLs that allow computers to access banned sites) have made a good start but could do much more with government encouragement and funding. On the government side, the US State Department's outstanding request for proposals for methods to promote the free flow of information through technology is a step in the right direction. Google's recent alliance with the National Security Agency is another model that could be replicated on a much broader scale. The key is to find ways to harness the ingenuity of large groups of internet savvy entrepreneurs to open what Secretary Clinton described as the "information curtain." Making freedom-hacking a patriotic hobby for US computer specialists has the potential to massively undermine Chinese censors.

Unlike most other types of pressure, threats to bypass China's internet censorship are entirely credible. Just as China has taken advantage of Western social conventions that inhibit retaliation against clandestine cyber assaults, attacks on Chinese censorship take advantage of Western conventions that encourage promoting freedom. Moreover, there is precedent for this approach. For more than 60 years Voice of America has overcome legal challenges and jamming to broadcast information into closed countries.

To have deterrent value, the United States must communicate to China that it intends to ramp up support to freedom militias until China relents. Members of Congress are currently calling for tens of millions of dollars to support this type of operation. China must be made to understand that given the magnitude of the costs their hackers are currently inflicting, the United States could afford to spend tens of billions and still come out ahead. Because it is difficult to call back private groups once activated, support should start small and present Chinese leaders with opportunities to concede (preferably without losing face) before escalating to the next level.
There is no guarantee that supporting freedom militias will reduce Chinese cyber aggression, but since the number and severity of Chinese cyber militia attacks are already increasing rapidly, to not act is to guarantee escalation. At the end of the day, even if US support to freedom militias fails to deter cyber attacks it will signal China that there are costs as well as benefits to attacking US targets. That, in itself, might be worth the cost.

Richard B. Andres is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at National Defense University.

Paul McNiel is a research intern at INSS.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Worst in Aid?

2010-04-19T15:29:00.004-04:00

Brian Atwood's article "Elevating Development Assistance," which will be published in PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010), is already fueling debate. AidWatch awarded its "Grand Prize for the Worst in Aid" to the "defense, diplomacy, development," or 3D, approach that Atwood discusses. Is AidWatch being too harsh, or do they raise valid points?

Worst in Aid: The Grand Prize

By William Easterly and Laura Freschi | Published March 15, 2010

Hillary Clinton recently declared: “We are working to elevate development and integrate it more closely with defense and diplomacy in the field…The three Ds must be mutually reinforcing.”

Clinton says that the 3D approach will elevate development to the level of diplomacy and defense. Unfortunately, it could instead lower development further to an instrument employed to achieve military or political priorities. Clinton foresaw these objections: “There is a concern that integrating development means diluting it or politicizing it – giving up our long-term development goals to achieve short-term objectives.” She said reassuringly, “[t]hat is not what we mean, nor what we will do.”

But it’s too late. Sacrificing long term development aims for short term military and diplomatic objectives is what the US already does, and the 3Ds is making it worse. That’s why the Grand Prize for the Worst in Aid goes to…the 3D approach, nominated by an anonymous reader.

References to the “3D approach,”… have become so pervasive in foreign policy, development, and national security circles that they have taken on the status of self-evident, common wisdom.
- J. Brian Atwood, former USAID administrator, February 2010

The frequent contradiction between defense and development is the most obvious instance of 3D dissonance. A coalition of eight NGOs in Afghanistan lamented that “[d]evelopment projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structres aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate, and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable.” Nonetheless, increasing amounts of aid get channeled through the military, “while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined.”

Click here to read more.

Letter to the Editor

2010-04-16T07:40:00.002-04:00

PRISM is published by the National Defense University Press for the Center for Complex Operations. We welcome your feedback and encourage you to let us know how we're doing. Here's an excerpt from a letter we received from Robert D. Payne III of the US Army.

9 APR 2010

SUBJECT: Recommendation from PRISM Vol. 1, No. 1, 12/2009

1. First I want to thank you for your contributions to PRISM: Center for Complex Operations. As an active duty officer in the USA it was both encouraging and inspiring to read that there is progress being made on how the US handles the current and future challenges which face our nation. The articles were both informative and insightful.

I humbly offer this recommendation of the topics discussed in the first four articles of Prism which focused on the future of America’s strategy in complex operations. As a former platoon leader on the ground everyday in Iraq I am not attempting to criticize anything in the journal; I simply hope to add to the discussion of how America can take on such challenges as Iraq and Afghanistan in the future.

Thank you again for the time and effort made to enlighten young officers like myself and thank you for your service to our nation.

2. The current shortfalls.

As Dr. Schaubelt points out in his Complex Operations article the greatest shortcoming in America’s handling of complex operations is its Interagency operations, or lack thereof. Currently Battalion level leadership is what has driven progress in Iraq and Afghanistan and will drive progress in every imaginable complex operation. It is the Battalion Commander (Lt. Colonel) and his staff which guide actions on the ground. They execute the day to day operations and thus have the greatest influence over the politics as much as security level of the area. It is because of this that I believe the most efficient way to maximize U.S. involvement in complex operations is to put State Department civilians inside the Battalion and above staff sections and transform the Army National Guard force into a Corp of Engineers.

The structure of the military in the 21st century should no longer be limited to military soldiers and DOD civilians. The “shadow” enemy of the 21st century which was the U.S. and NATO have been facing down since 9/11 has forced the tactical evolution from the Cold War doctrine to a more flexible, divers, and highly integrated military warfare. This transformation has proven successful, but should not stop at its current aims.

The transformation in the U.S. Army from Pure (infantry, armor, artillery) brigade and battalion size elements to the Combined Arms brigade and battalion has proven successful and is a testament to the effectiveness of the military community as a whole as well as the DOTLMP-F over all. However, the transformation and diversification has not gone far enough to be as efficient as possible because it lacks effective civilian political mission analysis at the lowest level and depends too heavily on short term deployable DOD contractors. As Lieutenant General Barno USA (Ret.) reminded readers in his article Military Adaption in Complex Operations, all warfare is an extension of politics and that is the expertise missing on the ground in today’s military.

Click here to read more.

Expeditionary Energy Roundtable with USMC Commandant General Conway

2010-04-15T08:38:00.009-04:00

General James T. Conway, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps was the Distinguished Lecturer yesterday, speaking on "Marine Corps Current Operations."

General Conway referred to comments made at the the "Expeditionary Energy Roundtable" at which he was a featured speaker. Here is an excerpt from the INSS Event Report written by Richard B. Andres, PhD, and Gayle Von Eckartsberg.

Expeditionary Energy Roundtable with USMC Commandant General Conway

The Marines are focused on energy not because they want to, but because they have to.
-USMC Commandant General James Conway

December 9, 2009 By Richard B. Andres and Gayle Von Eckartsberg

On December 9, 2009, National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies hosted a workshop on Marine Corps expeditionary energy on behalf of Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Conway. The purpose of the event was to lay out the Commandant’s strategic vision for Marine Corps expeditionary energy and to begin to connect the Corps with leading energy experts in academe and industry.

General Conway opened the meeting by stating his intent for the Marine Corps to become the nation’s leader in expeditionary energy. He emphasized that the Marine Corps must “create an organic capability that allows you to go anywhere, do what you have to do in ungoverned spaces” and do so “without the expectation of a one-to-one Marine-to-contractor support structure…without supply lines vulnerable to disruption.” The goal is an expeditionary energy paradigm that is “lighter, more efficient, less costly, better for the environment, and can also save lives.”

The NDU workshop was the third event in a rapid-fire series of Marine Corps activities designed to jumpstart a conversation with industry and to connect the newly formed Marine Corps Energy Office with key energy thinkers. Throughout the half-day session, the Commandant and his energy leaders urged the experts to think through the Marine Corps’ challenge. To set the stage, Colonel T.C. Moore briefed the key findings of the Afghanistan assessment team which looked at the expeditionary needs of forward operating bases and main operating bases in August 2009. The team found that electricity generation at the main operating bases is inefficient, lacking incentives to reduce demand and the infrastructure to optimize performance of generator systems. Forward bases have a different challenge: demand for water is approximately seven times greater than for fuel. Bottled water is carried forward by Marine truck convoys, putting 200 vehicles and crews at risk of IED attack each month. Seventy percent of the Corps’ logistics burden is fuel and water. This energy tail is a major vulnerability and a constraint on expeditionary missions.

Click here to read more.

Follow the Money?

2010-04-14T07:22:00.002-04:00

An article on today’s Strategy Page lauds efforts by the U.S. Treasury Department to interrupt the flow of financing that allows terrorists to carry out attacks. But in the current issue of Joint Force Quarterly, Stephanie Ahern argues that because it is not traditionally thought of as a player in the national security arena, Treasury is being underleveraged as an asset. As national security moves toward a more whole-of-government effort, are other organizations and institutions being underutilized as well?

The Loss of a Great Friend

2010-04-12T11:45:00.005-04:00

The following article is from EUCOMverstaions, the official blog of the U.S. European Command. It addresses the loss of General Franciszek Gagor, Chief of Defense of Poland, in the recent plane crash tragedy in Russia. General Gagor was an NDU graduate.

The Loss of a Great Friend
I’m flying over the deep blue of the southern Pacific Ocean — enroute to New Zealand and Australia for security discussions about Afghanistan — and I’ve just learned of the death of Polish General and Chief of Defense Franciszek Gagor, along with the President of Poland and much of the senior leadership.

As I look down over the white caps of the sea, I think of my friend and the sudden nature of his death in a plane crash enroute to a memorial gathering near Smolensk, Russia in remembrance of 70th anniversary of the Katyn Massacre. What a tragic loss for his family, for Poland, and for the cause of security in the world.

Franciszek lived a full and meaningful life, and all of us at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe mourn his loss. He was not only a leader in his nation’s military, but also a strong and highly respected voice in the councils of NATO. He spoke fluent and idiomatic English, along with French and Russian and his native Polish of course. General Gagor was a powerful thinker, a diplomatic statesman, and a superb military leader. He had attended the National Defense University in the U.S. and we often spoke of the vital importance of education for our senior officers. He published many thoughtful articles and a well regarded book on peacekeeping operations, in which he was widely respected as an expert.

Franciszek led much of the preparations for Poland’s entry into NATO, and had served as a General officer since being promoted to Brigadier back in 1997. He was among the senior Chief’s of Defense in the Alliance, and when he spoke in council, everyone listened closely.

Laura and I had a lovely visit with him and his wife Lucy just a few months ago in Warsaw, a week or so before Christmas. We walked the streets of the restored city, and his sense of history and the irony of it all was clear and deep. I’ll always remember a light snow falling and thinking how lucky I was to know him — a man of conviction, intelligence, and blessed with a fine sense of humor. The next day, we drank Bison vodka and sat in front of a fireplace after a formal dinner and he reflected on the passages of his life and career, from the post-war history of his beloved Poland to the Warsaw Pact and on to his role today as a leader in NATO. Personally, I deeply valued his advice on topics ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans to NATO reform and the emerging strategic concept.

Franciszek Gagor represented the best of our senior military, and above my fireplace at home is the Polish cavalry sabre he gave me during our visit. I’ll treasure it, as I do the memories of this great friend.

Admiral James Stavridis
Commander, U.S. European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Weigh in on the Predator War

2010-03-31T15:47:00.005-04:00

On the Small Wars Journal Web site, Dr. Amitai Etzioni of The George Washington University has been soliciting comments about the tradeoff between the benefits of drone usage and the potential for collateral damage. Dr. Etzioni points to his article, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Moral and Legal Case,” which appears in the April issue of Joint Force Quarterly, as a refutation of arguments against drone usage made by Jane Mayer in the October 26, 2009, issue of The New Yorker.

Where do you stand on this?

Countering WMD in the 2010 QDR

2010-03-17T09:45:00.002-04:00

Last year, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University (NDU) produced an assessment of the Government’s readiness to prevent and manage major WMD events [Are We Prepared?]. In the following Proceedings, CSWMD Senior Researcher John P. Caves, Jr., uses that assessment as a yardstick to measure how the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review addresses the shortcomings he and his colleagues identified, where he feels that it fails to adequately address those shortcomings, and how the 2010 version resembles or departs from its 2006 predecessor. The Proceedings are a transcript of comments that Caves delivered at QDR 2010: Implementing the New Path for America’s Defense, a symposium held last week at NDU.

Click here to view the PDF.

The Moral and Legal Case for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

2010-03-09T07:55:00.005-05:00

As the U.S. Air Force grapples with how to institutionally acknowledge the status of Airmen who pilot unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) such as the Predator and Reaper, the systems are being used more frequently and to great effect in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The increase in the systems’ employment is apparent in an interactive graphic representation of UAS strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2010, created by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation. Using what they consider to be trusted open media sources, the researchers compiled data on the dates and locations of strikes, names of personnel who were the assumed targets, and known or estimated casualties. Several high-level al Qaeda and Taliban leaders reportedly have been killed by UAS in Pakistan in recent weeks, and clicking on the graphic will bring up some recognizable and infamous names.

Despite their apparent utility, however, the employment of UAS has prompted ethical questions. In the forthcoming issue of Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 57, April 2010), Professor Amitai Etzioni makes the moral and legal case for their use.

Click here to read the Etzioni article.

Operational Control in Afghanistan

2010-03-08T10:08:00.006-05:00

On Thursday, General David Petraeus announced that he was broadening General Stanley McChrystal’s authority over U.S. forces in Afghanistan to an extent unprecedented for commanders in that country. General McChrystal has now gained operational control over some forces that were previously outside his purview as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, including Marine elements and Special Operations forces.

Author Charles T. Berry, Jr., brings some clarity to the meaning of operational control and the derivation of its authority in relation to joint doctrine in his article “Understanding OPCON” in the April issue of Joint Force Quarterly.

Read his article here: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/berry.pdf.

Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

2010-03-03T11:06:00.006-05:00

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest assessment of Iran’s nuclear activities—the first issued under new Director-General Yukiya Amano—suggests for the first time that Tehran had either resumed work on a nuclear warhead or had never stopped doing so 3 years ago, as thought by U.S. intelligence agencies. The report, considered more strongly worded and forthright than any issued under Amano’s predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei, is being called “misleading” and “unbalanced” by Tehran.

As the nuclear environment becomes more heated, the IAEA’s role becomes more critical. In the following Strategic Forum, Ambassador Gregory Schulte points out several actions the agency must take to regain the clout it needs to be a prime mover in this environment: its verification capability must be strengthened; it must continue to shape the global growth of safe, secure nuclear power; it must be willing to confront difficult topics with the goal of consensus; and its technical mandate must be restored by Director-General Amano.

Click here to read the Strategic Forum No. 253

DOD Releases Policy for Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-Based Capabilities

2010-03-01T15:04:00.004-05:00

The following News Release was posted to the U.S. Department of Defense Web site on February 26, 2010.

Today the Department of Defense released a policy memorandum regarding the safe and effective use of Internet-based capabilities, including social networking services (SNS) and other interactive Web 2.0 applications.

The memorandum makes it policy that the DoD non-classified network be configured to provide access to Internet-based capabilities across all DoD components. Commanders at all levels and heads of DoD components will continue to defend against malicious activity on military information networks, deny access to prohibited content sites (e.g., gambling, pornography, hate-crime related activities), and take immediate and commensurate actions, as required, to safeguard missions (e.g., temporarily limiting access to the Internet to preserve operations security or to address bandwidth constraints).

The directive is consistent with the increased security measures that the Department has taken to secure its networks and reinforces existing regulations related to ethics, operations security, and privacy.

“This directive recognizes the importance of balancing appropriate security measures while maximizing the capabilities afforded by 21st Century Internet tools,” said Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III.

Use of Internet-based capabilities, including SNS, have become integral tools for operating and collaborating across the DoD and with the general public. Establishing a DoD-wide policy ensures consistency and allows for full integration of these tools and capabilities.

The new policy memorandum is available at: http://www.defense.gov/NEWS/DTM%2009-026.pdf.

Point/Counterpoint: U.S-Mexico Defense Relations

2010-02-23T14:36:00.010-05:00

Earlier this week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Mexican Secretary of Public Safety Genaro Garcia Luna signed a Declaration of Principles of Cooperation on Joint Efforts to Secure the U.S.-Mexico Border. The declaration expands on Merida Initiative programs to improve cooperation in intelligence-driven operations, increase bilateral situation awareness of threats, and bolster the personnel, infrastructure, and technology needed to prevent criminal exploitation of entry points.

While border security may seem to dominate the relationship between the United States and Mexico, it is only one of many bilateral issues that the two nations grapple with. The authors of the two essays below have different opinions on the track record of U.S-Mexican cooperation. Dr. Craig Deare argues that ways must be found to enhance collaboration and cooperation in defense relationships, while General Victor Renuart and Dr. Biff Baker contend that the creation of U.S. Northern Command has greatly improved cooperation in all complementary areas of concern.

U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface
by Craig A. Deare

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface
by Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

An Operation by Any Other Name. . .

2010-02-22T14:17:00.010-05:00

In the next issue of JFQ, Colonel William Mullen III, USMC, discusses his involvement in helping to turn around the city of Fallujah, Iraq, during Operation Al Fajr - in English, Operation New Dawn. Perhaps tapping into the positive experience associated with the name, the Obama administration has announced that starting in September, Operation Iraqi Freedom will be known as Operation New Dawn.

NOTE: The following article discusses the name change and was written by Greg Jaffe. It appeared in the Washington Post on February 19, 2010.

War in Iraq will be called 'Operation New Dawn' to reflect reduced U.S. role
By Greg Jaffe

The Obama administration has decided to give the war in Iraq a new name -- "Operation New Dawn" -- to reflect the reduced role U.S. troops will play in securing the country this year as troop levels fall, according to a memo from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Since U.S. forces charged across the Kuwaiti border toward Baghdad in 2003, the war has been known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The new name is scheduled to take effect in September, when U.S. troop levels are supposed to drop to about 50,000.

The change is intended to send a message that the U.S. military's combat role in Iraq is rapidly drawing to a close. In the Feb. 17 memo, Gates wrote to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top commander for the region, that the name change seeks to "recognize our evolving relationship with the Government of Iraq."

Such name changes are not unusual. The name of the 1991 Persian Gulf War changed as the mission changed, from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm and then finally to Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch.

The name change for the current conflict was first reported by ABC News, which posted the memo on its Web site. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed the decision.

Elevating Development Assistance

2010-02-04T10:08:00.018-05:00

By J. Brian Atwood

This is an except from an article that will be published in PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010).

J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert Humphrey Institute for Public Policy at the University of Minnesota and former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

References to the "3D approach," "whole of government," or "holistic approach" have become so pervasive in foreign policy, development, and national security circles that they have taken on the status of self-evident, common wisdom. In the following article, J. Brian Atwood discusses some of the tensions among the 3Ds and offers nuanced views on their further integration.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the "elevation" of the development mission and an end to the old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new "mindset" to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome reflection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues.

What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the difficult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality.

How does the administration define the word elevate in terms of resources, structure, and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. As someone who has held executive positions in both State and USAID, I want Secretary Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there are hurdles to overcome.

USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy administration, has been seen as the premier development agency within the international donor community. It led that community toward highly innovative interventions in economic reform, health, education, democracy/governance, agriculture, and the environment. These interventions and the evolution of a comprehensive, internationally accepted development strategy, backed by financial commitment, formed the basis of American leadership in development.

Click here to read the rest of the article.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: Today’s Wars Are Job One

2010-02-03T11:00:00.011-05:00

In Monday’s news briefing on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary Gates stated that "achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, policy, and program priorities."

The objective of prevailing in current wars is obviously a major departure from the longstanding force-sizing construct of planning for two major theater wars. But it also was a discussion point over a year ago in Joint Force Quarterly, when John Nagl and Gian Gentile debated the long-term implications and wisdom of a focus on counterinsurgency doctrine and training for the U.S. Army. You can revisit the argument here:

John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 20 .

Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 27.

JFQ figures into testimony

2010-02-02T14:10:00.007-05:00

The Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen this morning on the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. While questioning Admiral Mullen, Senator Jeff Sessions (R–AL) referred to an essay published in issue 55 of Joint Force Quarterly.

"The Efficacy of 'Don’t Ask, Don't Tell'" was written by Colonel Om Prakash, USAF, while he was a student at the National War College. The essay won the 2009 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and, along with the winning essays in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition, was published in Joint Force Quarterly. You can read Colonel Prakash’s essay here:

http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/14.pdf

Review of Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas

2010-01-29T10:26:00.012-05:00

A recent draft version of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review suggests the need for a "new architecture of cooperation" when considering the U.S. military’s future overseas posture. The document notes that the post—Cold War reduction in forward-stationed forces, a trend continued by the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review, has both generated benefits and incurred costs: "This approach undervalued our long-term relationships while overvaluing reliance on technological solutions to security challenges."

Defense policymakers contemplating the erection of this "new architecture" may find some insight in Alexander Cooley’s Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Cornell University Press, 2008), reviewed for Joint Force Quarterly by David A. Mastro.

Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas
By Alexander Cooley
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008
328 pp. $29.95
ISBN–13: 978–0–8014–4605–4

Reviewed by DAVID A. MASTRO

Base Politics is an exceptional academic study on how domestic politics in countries hosting U.S. military bases affect the status of those bases and the degree to which the military has been integrated into their local and national landscapes. Cooley, an assistant professor of political science at Barnard College and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, draws on cases from Southern Europe, East Asia, and Central Asia to explain how and why politicians in host countries accept or contest the presence of the U.S. military on their territory. Through comparative case study analysis, he finds that democratizing states are the most politically volatile base hosts due to low contractual credibility, whereas consolidated democracies are the most stable since contractual credibility is high. Cooley also shows how authoritarian states will only honor basing agreements if they further regime survival. When taken together, these findings represent the first comprehensive theory for understanding the conditions under which U.S. military basing arrangements in host countries become politicized. This makes Cooley's book required reading for defense policymakers charged with establishing and maintaining America’s overseas military influence.

Base Politics is a superior study for several reasons, one of which is the variety of cases Cooley examines. Researchers often focus on cases that they are either intimately familiar with or where data are easily obtainable. However, Cooley, who is originally a scholar of post-Soviet politics, conducted extensive field research to examine several cases from different geographic regions. As Cooley explains, "[b]y executing cross-regional comparisons, I move away from region-specific accounts or purely historical narratives and explore theoretically comparable institutional characteristics within the political systems of different base hosts" (51). This approach is a hallmark of comparative political study as it facilitates generalization, which gives Cooley’s theory applicability beyond the cases he examines. Therefore, Cooley’s theory can be used by defense policymakers who are contemplating the future political dynamics of America’s basing presence in various countries. This is especially important given the current security climate in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Second, Cooley discusses how his theory challenges alternative explanations in international relations literature and other discussions of U.S. overseas bases. In particular, he compares his theory of base politics to explanations that focus on security pressures, base size and troop levels, base use and incidents, and social attitudes. Cooley posits that although the alternative explanations all have the potential to explain selected episodes or trends in the cases he examines, none of them can explain the full range of issues surrounding "base politics" across different regions and historical eras (262). What makes this exercise in comparison so important is that it allows researchers and policymakers to easily see the value and importance of Cooley’s theory. Indeed, by comparing his theory of base politics to competing explanations, Cooley makes it very clear that his theory is original and has more explanatory power than previous explanations.

Despite its various advantages, Base Politics does suffer from a few shortcomings. First, nowhere does Cooley define democracy or authoritarianism. This makes it difficult to identify the political conditions under which his theory works best. Second, although Cooley selects a range of useful cases, more cases need to be examined before his findings can be considered a truly general theory of base politics. Similarly, Cooley needs to analyze cases that challenge his theory instead of ones that are likely to confirm it. A good candidate for an extreme case study would be the recent decision by the Kyrgyz government to evict the United States from its base at Manas. Here, Russian pressure, not domestic politics, appears to be the most important factor in the Kyrgyz government’s decision. Finally, the role of external factors on the host country’s decisionmaking process regarding the basing issue should be emphasized more. Although Cooley does discuss the role of external influences in all of his cases, he argues that their impact is negligible. This is troublesome given that, in certain geographic regions, the role of a regional hegemon (for example, Russia in Central Asia) must be taken into account. Moreover, in today’s globalized world, international relations and domestic politics are inextricably linked.

Nevertheless, because these shortcomings are mostly academic in nature, they do not detract from Base Politics’ practical usefulness. Defense policymakers, as well as researchers and analysts of base politics, should embrace Cooley’s book as it is the most comprehensive study on the topic to date. It presents a compelling explanation as to why U.S. basing arrangements in host countries become politicized. This will help identify the potential risks of entering into basing contracts with certain regimes, as well as make sense of the current “base politics” in host countries. Base Politics should also be embraced because it demonstrates that overseas bases are not simply military installations that serve a military purpose. Rather, they symbolize military power. Recognizing this fact is essential to establishing and maintaining a stable overseas basing presence, especially at a time when America’s popularity has dwindled throughout the world.

David A. Mastro holds a Ph.D. in political science from West Virginia University. His research focuses on foreign policy decisionmaking, national security policy, and post-Soviet politics.